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WHO WİNS AND WHO LOSES WİTH GREAT URBAN
PROJECTS? Operação Urbana Consorciada Água
Espraiada evaluation in São Paulo.
EDUARDO ALBERTO CUSCE NOBRE
Address: Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo da Universidade de São Paulo, Departamento
de Projeto, Rua do Lago, 876, 05008.080, São Paulo, SP, Brazil.
e-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT
Since late 20th Century the urban policy paradigm has modified considerably due to
great political and economic transformations that had occurred in the World. The
strengthening of globalization and the ascension of neoliberalism have resulted in
land use control change to the promotion and stimulation of the real estate market,
resulting in large scale urban projects in many cities of the world. These experiences
are consequence of urban deregulation in association with public-private
partnership and have recently become object of research. In Brazil, it stands
Operação Urbana Consorciada (Consortial Urban Operation) planning tool as the
main example of this trend. This paper aims to develop a critical analysis of the use
of this instrument, taking the OUCAE – Operação Urbana Consorciada Água
Espraiada in São Paulo as a case study. It searches to evaluate the intervention,
since its designing until its implementation by the Municipal Government,
concluding that it has caused the symbolic and financial valuation of an already
valorized area, favoring specific sectors of the capital, mainly the real estate and civil
construction ones, in detriment of social demands of affected populations.
INTRODUCTION
Since late 20th
century, the urban policy paradigm has modified considerably due to
major political and economic changes that had occurred in the World. The
exhaustion of postwar economic expansion and the subtle rise in the oil prices due
to the 1970s Oil Shocks have caused a Capitalism structural crisis (HARVEY, 1989).
In order to keep profitability levels, manufacturing activities have moved to new
regions, where cheap labor and the existence of infrastructure would allow greater
return, causing a process of urban decline in established manufacturing cities.
Traditional comprehensive urban planning gave way to strategic planning and the
GUP – Great Urban Projects (ibid.). Local governments and business groups joined
to stimulate the real estate market through land use deregulation and public
financing of these projects in order to attract international investment.
Former industrial districts, closed harbors, unused railway lines, vacant and derelict
areas were converted into luxurious new developments, representing a new
postmodern urban centrality in cases such as Baltimore Inner Harbor, London
C i t i e s , n a t i o n s a n d r e g i o n s i n p l a n n i n g h i s t o r y
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Docklands, New York Battery Park City, Paris La Defense, Barcelona Olympic
Village and so on, resulting in "winners" and "losers" in this process. The main
beneficiaries were landowners, developers and tourists, while the legitimate
demands for employment, housing, health and education of low-income local
classes were not met.
In Brazil, although the urban policy has not ever managed to solve the urban
problems, there was a significant shift on the discourse from the 1980s after the
Debt Crisis that affected Latin America at that time1
. Urban planning has moved
from a sort of welfare state comprehensive model, even if not effective, to a
neoliberal strategic one much influenced by multilateral organisms such as IMF, the
World Bank and IDB (VAINER, 2000).
In São Paulo, land use deregulation and urban public private partnerships have
consolidated with the implementation of new planning tools such as the Operações
Interligadas (Interconnected Operations) and afterwards the Operações Urbanas
Consorciadas (Consortial Urban Operations).
Presently, there is already a major theoretical reflection on its use in São Paulo. This
work, rather than exhausting the subject, will outline some of these questions, taking
as a case study the Operação Urbana Consorciada Água Espraiada in the
Southwest Zone of São Paulo Municipality.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF URBAN OPERATIONS IN SÃO PAULO
The term Urban Operation first appeared in São Paulo 1985/2000 Master Plan
proposal during Mario Covas office (1983-1985) as an urban planning tool whose
goal was to enable the production of housing, urban infrastructure, community
facilities and to accelerate urban transformations in accordance to the plan2
(SÃO
PAULO, 1985). In order to enable these interventions, the plan proposed the
establishment of PPPs - Public-Private Partnerships, as São Paulo municipality was
in financial difficulties due to the Brazilian economic crisis.
Jânio Quadros office (1986-1988), opposition to the former, did not implement this
instrument, though including it in the Master Plan. However, the PPP idea was made
possible through the creation of Operações Interligadas – Interconnected
Operations – a mechanism by which the private sector could change land use
requirements for new developments in their land occupied by favelas in exchange of
financing social housing construction for this population elsewhere (MONTANDON
1 From the 1960s to the 1970s many Latin American countries financed their economic growth
based on huge external loans since interest rates were low. In the 1970s the depression
caused by the Oil Shock hit these economies deeply.
2 The São Paulo Municipality 1985/2000 Master Plan proposed 35 urban operations in many
neighborhoods, from the central area to external periphery, from rich areas to favelas (SÃO
PAULO, 1985).
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& SOUZA, 2007, p. 86). With this mechanism many slums and favelas located in the
city center were removed and transferred to peripheral housing estates3
.
This tool was based on the “Solo Criado” idea, a Brazilian version of the French
“Plafond Legal de Densité”, much in vogue in the 1970s Urban Reform discussions
in Brazil, and originated the concept of granting building rights costly, which would
become the basis of urban operations.
Luiza Erundina office (1989-1992) continued this idea in Urban Operation
Anhagabaú, however without being very successful, due mainly to lack of interest of
the real estate market in the Historic City Center, which had become the center of
the lower-income classes.
The instrument would only take off in 1995 when Paulo Maluf office (1993-1996)
established the Faria Lima Urban Operation proposing this avenue extension in the
valued Southwest region. In fact, this operation had resulted until 2004 in R$ 309
million revenue arising from sales of almost one million square feet of additional
building, far short, however, the U.S. $ 715 million (R$ 893 million) predicted on
works (MONTADON & SOUZA, 2007). The area redevelopment was very harmful to
some neighborhoods where road infrastructure was not adequate, as in Vila
Olímpia, and it gentrified the areas affected, where there was a transformation of
middle-income residential use to high-income residential and upper services uses.
After this experience, the municipality created three other urban operations: Água
Branca (1995), Centro (1997) and Água Espraiada (2001). In 2001, the City Statute
(a Federal Law that regulates urban policy within the country) regulated this
instrument, redefining it as Operações Urabanas Consorciadas – consortial urban
operations, which is a set of urban interventions coordinated by the municipal
government with the participation of private enterprise, which aims are to achieve
"structural urban transformations, social improvements and environmental
enhancement" of a given area (BRAZIL, 2001, art. 32, § 1). In 2002, the PDEMSP -
Municipality of São Paulo Strategic Master Plan defined nine urban operations within
its perimeter (SÃO PAULO, 2002, art. 225, § 2).
PRECEDENTS TO THE ÁGUA ESPRAIADA URBAN OPERATION:
THE PROPOSED STRUCTURAL ROAD SYSTEM
The proposal of a structural road system along Água Espraiada Stream dates from
the 1968 when GEIPOT - Ministry of Transportation Policy Executive Group – based
on an existing plan for São Paulo inner ring road, proposed the creation of an
3 The Operações Interligadas were created by 10.209/86 By-law and modified by 11.773/95
By-law. They worked until 1998 when the State Attorney Office presented a charge of
unconstitutionality as the tool gave legislative function to the executive power. After the trial,
the tool was considered unconstitutional and extinguished in 2000. During its term there were
313 proposals, resulting in the construction of 11,102 social housing units (MONTANDON;
SOUZA, 2007, p. 86).
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avenue on its margins connecting Tietê and Pinheiros Rivers expressways (NOBRE,
2000). The area was a suburban middle-class neighborhood at that time.
In order to implement the ring road, the DER – Roads and Highways Department
carried out the expropriation of the area in the 1970s. However, problems of
economic viability and changes in the original design moved the ring road
construction to another area, as seen in Figure 1, leaving the expropriated area
abandoned.
Figure 1: São Paulo Metropolitan Region structural road system (Água
Espraiada Av. in red). Source: CESAD-FAUUSP, 2003 e DERSA, 1997.
Since then it had been gradually occupied by numerous favelas and by 1995 there
were 68 nuclei in the region, comprising a population of 42,347 people in 8,436
households (EMURB, 1996, p. 130). This caused the area inclusion in urban
operation proposals early in the 1985 and 1991 master plan proposals
(MONTANDON; SOUZA, op. cit., p. 85).
In 1995, the Municipality of São Paulo reviewed the avenue construction project,
linking the Pinheiros River Expressway to the Immigrants Highway, the main access
to São Paulo coast. The works were carried out very quickly between October 1995
and March 1996 with the partial removal of the slums, the stream channeling and
partial construction of the avenue between the Pinheiros River Expressway and
Washington Luis Avenue. According to reports at the time, the slum dwellers
received a financial compensation for removal made possible due to local
businessmen funding, expecting their offices and enterprises valorization (NOBRE,
2000, p. 189).
In 1996, 28 of the slums had been removed, with 20,000 people expelled (EMURB,
1996, loc. Cit.) that caused the region 30% valorization, aggravating the city socio-
spatial segregation problem. However, the municipality did not enact an urban
operation at that time. Fix (2001, p. 95) argues that the City did not want to create
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competition with the Faria Lima Urban Operation, that had started to be successful
considering the real estate market point of view.
FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OUCAE -
OPERAÇÃO URBANA CONSORCIADA ÁGUA ESPRAIADA
The proposal of an urban operation in this region was only resumed in Martha
Suplicy office (2001-2004). The Municipality enacted the 13,260 by-law that created
the OUCAE – Operação Urbana Consorciada Água Espraiada. This fact led to
some criticism by the intellectual leftist elite that supported the administration,
because of the instrument gentrifying character and because of its rapid enactment,
since the discussions of a new master plan were already well advanced and could
bring new points of view on the subject.
This by-law established guidelines for urban development within the operation
perimeter, comprising an area of 1,373.32 hectares, as shown in Figure 2. The main
interventions proposed were:
Extension of Journalista Roberto Marinho Avenue (the new name for Água
Espraiada Avenue) to Immigrants Highway along Água Espraiada stream
margins (approximately 4.5 km);
Opening of side tracks from Engenheiro Luis Carlos Berrini Avenue to
Washington Luis Avenue;
Two bridges over the Pinheiros River, linking the new avenue to the
Pinheiros River Expressway;
Fly-overs construction on the avenue junctions;
Implementation of pedestrian walkways;
Construction of 8,500 social housing units for existing favela dwellers.
Figure 2: Operação Urbana Consorciada Água Espraiada perimeter.
Source: São Paulo, 2001.
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The estimated value of the interventions was R$ 1.1 billion (almost US$ 500 million
at the time), and it was expected that most of the funds would come from the sale of
CEPAC - Additional Building Rights Certificates, bounds issued by the City which
allow the owner additional construction rights or land use change in any plot inside
the perimeter of the operation, sold at a public auction or used directly in payment
for works required for the operation (EMURB, 2004a, p. 33). The idea was to give
the operation financial independence, not repeating the mistake of Faria Lima
Urban Operation that had a financial deficit on its beginning.
It was proposed the issue of 3,750,000 CEPAC for a period of 15 years, at a
minimum initial value of R$ 300, allowing 4.85 million square meters of additional
construction. The minimum cost of CEPAC was calculated from the highest value it
could take in order to keep the enterprise lucrative (EMURB, 2004a, p. 105).
With regard to the operation management, the by-law established that EMURB4
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Municipal Urbanization Company was responsible for its implementation and
created the Água Espraiada Consortial Urban Operation Management Group, a
consultative and deliberative organism, composed by 17 members: eight municipal
government departments representatives and eight civil society representatives,
and its EMURB coordinator (SAO PAULO, 2001, art. 19). This composition has
allowed the interests of municipal government, which do not always represent the
interests of the affected population, prevail as their representatives are in vote
majority (9 out of 17). The first meeting of the Group in March 2003 set as priorities
the implementation of a bridge linking the southern Pinheiros River Expressway to
Água Espraiada Avenue, along with the construction of 600 social housing units to
partially attend the rest of local favelas (EMURB, 2004a, p. 353).
Between 2004 and 2008 eight CEPAC auctions were performed raising about R$
440 million (US$ 260 million), consuming 589,000 square meters of the stock
(EMURB, 2008, p. 20 and 21). The bonds had valued 370%, trading at R$ 1,110.00
in February 2008. From the first auction, the City reviewed the proposed works,
focusing on the bridge over the Pinheiros River located next to a remaining slum.
The area had already suffered a strong real estate valuation until this phase, result
from the investments already made. According to a consulting firm report, between
1994 and 2003, the real estate valuation in the area had reached 300%, arriving to
R$ 3,000 per square meter of land (US$ 1,000)(AMARAL D'AVILA, 20045
, apud
EMURB, 2004a, p.103).
4 EMURB – Municipal Urbanization Company – is a public company created in 1971, which
function is to build urban development works and to develop urban renewal programs of the
Municipality of São Paulo (EMURB, 2004a, p. 63).
5 AMARAL D'AVILA ENGENHARIA DE AVALIAÇÕES. Estudo de Viabilidade da Operação
Urbana Água Espraiada. São Paulo: Amaral D´Avila, 2004.
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE REAL PARQUE ROAD COMPLEX
According to EMURB Development Board documents (2004b, p. 21), the decision
to build first the bridge over Pinheiros river occurred yet in 2001 and from the
beginning it was evident the choice for a cable-stayed bridge with the intention to
create a landmark for the region. The intention was to reinforce the area symbolic
power, valorizing an already valorized area in urban renewal since the 1980s, with a
high dynamic land market and concentrating transnational companies. This fact can
be seen in different circumstances found in the documents that are part of the
information provided to OUCAE investors.
In a report of 30 August 2001, EMURB Director of Development says the choice of
cable-staying came out of many factors, however it was clear that the symbolic
character of an alleged modernity was more important than the strictly technical
needs:
"The physical characteristics of the area, the region transformation process with the
emergence of numerous intelligent buildings, the works requirements to reduce the negative
impacts during the implementation, the design and works execution development and the
need to qualify the urban aesthetics through a different project that can be understood as a
reference to the city, these factors together point towards the cable-stayed constructive
option" (EMURB, 2004b, p. 21).
The technical needs of the project could have been resolved by a conventional
building system, much cheaper than the cable-stayed one, as can be seen in the
University of São Paulo Polytechnic School technical report, commissioned by
EMURB in May 2002. In this report, the landmark function was again at the first
place:
"It (the cable-stayed bridge) is the solution that best fulfills the function of a city landmark and
more easily deal with local constraints for its structural qualities, such as ease of winning large
spans with reduced heights ... This solution should be a little more expensive than the solution
in successive consoles. Considering the information given and the experience it is estimated
that the cost per m2 of a cable-stayed bridge is around 70% more expensive than the
successive consoles bridge ... it is estimated that in total value, the work will be around 20 to
30% more expensive than the solution in successive consoles" (EMURB, 2004b, p. 33).
In April 2003 EMURB hired the office that developed the bridge basic design,
coming to the solution of building two pillars approximately 110 meters high to
support the stays. In October of that year, the contractors were hired to build the
works at a cost of approximately R$ 147 million (ibid.).
When developing the executive project, the contractors argued that the two pillars
could be replaced by only one, approximately 30% higher (138 meters) at a lower
cost, creating "a landmark of great prominence and visibility for both Journalista
Roberto Marinho Avenue and the Pinheiros River channel, becoming a new symbol
for the city of São Paulo" (EMURB, 2004b, p. 135). The works began in 2004, with
budget and resources arising from CEPAC auctions.
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On February 2005, the new municipal office (2005-2008), opposition to the previous,
suspended for one hundred days the contract for value review. At that time, Mayor
José Serra said about the bridge:
"They wanted to do something pompous, expensive. This cable-stayed structure was just for
vanity, only to spend money. It does not help the traffic and costs a fortune. If we have time
and conditions, the project will change" (PAGNAN, 2007, p. C7).
In May of that year the contract was resumed without significant changes. At last,
beyond the R$ 2 million fine for the contract suspension, the Serra office (2005-
2008) ended up spending R$ 119 million more than originally planned, of which R$
48 million spent on additives and R$ 71 million on new works for the removal of high
voltage cables, construction of an access road to the Pinheiros River Expressway,
signage and special lighting, as reported by CEF - Caixa Econômica Federal, the
inspection agent responsible for controlling the CEPAC (EMURB, 2008, p. 35 and
36).
The Real Parque Road Complex (Figures 3 and 4) was inaugurated in August 2008,
costing R$ 266 million (US$ 160 million) - an increase of 81% higher than the
original price and having spent 56 months against the original forecast of 18
months.
Figure 3: Real Parque Road Complex. Source: the author, 2008.
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Figure 4: Real Parque Road Complex besides a remaining favela.
Source: the author, 2008.
By that time, the OUCAE had consumed R$ 303.5 million related to construction,
expropriation costs, taxes and fees, and of this total, R$ 60.2 million (20%) were
paid by the Municipal Treasury, and was not compensated by CEPAC sale funds,
burdening the investment capacity of the municipality itself (ibid.). From the social
housing units predicted in 2003 not even one was built, and EMURB had spent only
0.7% of the total value, corresponding to the area expropriation.
Analyzing SP Urbanismo6
most recent data (São Paulo Urbanismo, December of
2011), one can see that this trend has changed a little, as social housing units
construction has been contracted. However the amount spent with road works
continued to be the majority (R$ 361 million), representing 66.4% of total spent,
whereas social housing construction has consumed only 5.4% and expropriation for
social housing purposed has reached 16.7%.
Although there is a bid of R$ 137 million to be spent in social housing, the plan for a
linear park and a tunnel construction will probably worsen the situation with the
removal of the remaining favelas and road works cost reaching R$ 2 billion. Another
issue to be noted, is that the building typology under construction (high-rise flats as
in figure 5) is generally provided for middle-lower income families (earning from 5 to
10 minimum wages), whereas the average income of the remaining favelas families
barely reach 3 minimum wages.
6 In 2010 the EMURB was split into two new companies: São Paulo Urbanismo e São Paulo
Obras. Whereas the first is responsible for the planning of municipal urban development
works, the second is responsible for their implementation and execution.
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Figure 5: Jardim Edite housing development under construction.
Source: SP-Urbanismo, 2011.
Table 1: OUCAE amount raised and spent in R$ and % of total.
Total Auctions 1,159,921,713.00 82.5%
Total Private Placements 55,030,819.86 3.9%
Financial income 190,484,775.02 13.6%
TOTAL REVENUE 1,405,437,307.88 100%
Works – Real Parque Road Complex 361,875,520.22 66.4%
Social Housing – expropriation 90,850,206.29 16.7%
Management fees 44,291,087.36 8.1%
Social Housing 29,657,978.51 5.4%
Other expenses 18,648,200.82 3.4%
TOTAL SPENT 545,322,993.20 100%
FINAL 860,114,314,68
Source: SP-Urbanismo, December 2011.
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FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The analysis of OUCAE case study is symptomatic and only reinforces the critique
that has been made to this planning tool.
The first question that arises is the priority of this project. Since Água Espraiada is
no longer part of the ring road, it favors the São Paulo Southwest region, where
most of high-income classes live and that have had a great number of road
improvement since the 1970s. The recent prohibition of truck traffic in this area
shows the ambivalence of this project that clearly will benefit the elite car owners.
The project reinforces one of the most negative aspects of São Paulo urban
planning paradigm: the constant emphasis on road works that generally benefits
automobiles. If the project has been different, money could have been invested in
subway expansion that would benefit a much larger population7
. On the other hand,
the proposed road will not meet the traffic impacts when the new enterprises from
the CEPAC start to being built. They will cause a demand for more road works, as
today the Pinheiros River Expressway is already jammed most of time8
.
The second very negative aspect of the project is that it actually caused the
expulsion of at least 20,000 low-income people of the region, when the favelas were
removed, worsening socio-spatial segregation in a city quite segregated already.
Despite the fact that it had occurred prior to the OUCAE enactment, for its
implementation the way it was proposed, this population would have to leave
sooner or later. The remaining low-income population is threatened by a
gentrification process going on since the land prices are skyrocketing. Worse still,
São Paulo Urbanismo present plan to build a linear park on the remaining stream
valley will definitely expel the remaining favelas. The amount predicted to be spent
with social housing up to now will definitely not solve the problem. One can also
question for whom the social housing under construction is for, as high-rise flats are
generally too much expensive for the lower income strata.
Considering this aspect, it is notorious the municipality disregard with existing low-
income population, as the investment prioritized road works, with a little amount of
social housing units being built to date (252 units), despite the initial forecast and
the existence of numerous ZEIS9
in the area. If the total revenue has been invested
in social housing construction, it would have been possible to build 10,440 units (at
a cost of R$ 52,200.00 each according to SEHAB – Housing Secretariat), enough to
allocate the entire existing favela population in the 1990s. The fact that this
population is under-represented in the Management Group and that the
government has a majority of votes there also demonstrate the government
indifference and the existing political forces composition.
7 Considering the present plan, twenty kilometers of a subway line could be built with the
amount predicted for the OUCAE, enough to carry 1.07 million passengers a day considering
São Paulo Metro present carriage performance.
8 In 1996 this avenue was working already at its capacity at peak hours with 8,415 vehicles in
the express lanes (maximum capacity of 8,800) and 6.765 vehicles in the local lanes
(maximum capacity of 6,600) (EMURB, 1996, p. 130).
9 ZEIS – Social Interest Special Zones are zones designed to urban rehabilitation, land tenure
regularization and social housing production (SÃO PAULO, 2002, art. 171).
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The amount spent on the cable-stayed bridge proved to be a large transfer of funds
for the construction industry; an exceptional spending much higher than necessary
because it has prioritized the aesthetic factor, the creation of a landmark in the area,
in detriment of technical and economic factors. The association of the government
with constructor and real estate capitals, using road works to promote an area
financial and symbolic valorization is not new in Sao Paulo and has been
considered by several authors.
However, the novelty here was that the project that favored the interests of the ruling
classes started in a leftist PT – Workers´ Party - administration (2001-2004),
historically linked to the social issues and to the working class, demonstrating the
power of neoliberalism ideology ascension.
Concluding, the OUCAE implementation in São Paulo is a perfect example of a
GUP that best represents the affirmation of neoliberalism in the urban policy,
concentrating financial resources in the construction of major road works, whose
main beneficiaries are the contractors, land owners and entrepreneurs, in detriment
of attending the legitimate demands for employment, housing, health and education
of local low-income classes affected by the project.
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