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SEP09
The Public Cost of Private Security in AfghanistanBriefing Paper
Jake Sherman and Victoria DiDomenico
CENTER ON
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
New York University
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In Pursuit o Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins o Mediation
About the Center on International Cooperation
The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University
works to enhance international responses to humanitarian crises
and global security threats through applied research and direct
engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy
community. It has an international reputation or agenda-setting
work on post-conict peacebuilding, global peace operations, and UN
reorm.
CICs Aghanistan Reconstruction Project (ARP) carries out research
and public education about selected issues related to the rebuilding oAghanistans institutions, society, and economy. The project supports
eorts by the Aghan government, Aghan civil society, the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Aghanistan, and donors to carry out a
more eective reconstruction mission based on the Bonn Agreement
and the Aghanistan Compact ocused on Aghan ownership.
About the Authors
Jake Sherman
is Associate Director or Peacekeeping and SecuritySector Reorm at the Center on International Cooperation, and a
member o CICs Aghanistan Reconstruction Project (ARP) team.
Victoria DiDomenico is a Program Ocer or CICs Peacekeeping and
SSR Program.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the Royal Government o Norway
or its generous support o the ARP. We also grateul to Dr. BarnettR. Rubin, Director o ARP, Mark Sedra, and several anonymous peer
reviewers or their comments on earlier versions o this report. The
views expressed in this report do not necessarily reect those o the
Norwegian Government.
Center on
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Cooperation
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Executive Summary 01
Introduction 02
The Private Security Phenomenon 03
Afghan Regulation Initiatives 04
Employing and Empowering Illegal Militias 06
Rivals to State Authority 07
The Need for Credible Public Security 09
Conclusion 10
Annex
The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan
Briefing PaperJake Sherman and Victoria DiDomenico
Table oContents
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Acronyms
ACOD Armed Contractor Oversight Division
AGNA ArmorGroup North America
ANA Aghan National Army
ANP Aghan National Police
ANSF Aghan National Security Force
APPF Aghan Public Protection Force
ASG Armed Support Group
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Aghanistan
DIAG Disbandment o Illegal Armed GroupsDoD US Department o Deense
DoS US Department o State
FDD Focused District Development
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MoI Ministry o Interior
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC Private Security Company
PSP Private Security Provider
SIGAR Special Inspector General or Aghanistan Reconstruction
UN United Nations
USAID US Agency or International Development
USPI US Protection and Investigations
USSF US Special Forces
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The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan
The absence o eective oversight o the private
security sector in Aghanistan undermines the
credibility and saety o the Aghan government and
the international stabilization eort. In September
2009, an investigation into ArmorGroup North America,
the private security company (PSC) contracted by the US
Department o State to protect the US embassy in Kabul,
Aghanistan revealed misconduct and poor management
that jeopardized the saety o embassy personnel. Their
culturally oensive behavior, graphically documented,
is likely to urther damage Aghan perceptions o PSCs
and could potentially erode the legitimacy o the United
States and its allies.1
The private security industry in Aghanistan has
grown apace with demand. As o August 2009, the total
number o private security personnel employed by the US
Department o Deense the largest employer o private
security in the country increased 19 percent (rom 4,373
to 5,198) in response to the deployment o additional
military orces.2 Since 2001, a range o private security
providers (PSPs)3 has emerged, including international
and national PSCs operating with or without the required
Aghan licensing permits, as well as militias hired as armed
support groups (ASG) by international military orces.
Many PSPs are controlled by prominent Aghan amilies,
including Hashmat and Ahmed Wali Karzai, brothers o
President Hamid Karzai; Hamid Wardak, the son o Deense
Minister Rahim Wardak; Gul Agha Shirzai, the governor o
Nangarhar province; and Hajji Jan Mohammad Khan, the
ormer governor o Uruzgan.
The use o unregistered PSCs and militia groups by
the NATO International Security Assistance Force and
US military contingents is widespread. Many o these
PSPs serve as ready-made militias that compete with state
authority and are requently run by ormer military com-manders responsible or human rights abuses or involved
in the illegal narcotics and black market economies. Fi-
nancing armed, alternative power structures ullls secu-
rity needs in the short-term at the cost o consolidating
government authority in the long-term.
PSPs ulfll a need or which there is no clear, immediate
alternative. There are too ew Aghan National Police to
provide protection or the sta, premises, and projects o
the international community and too little condence
in their ability among most internationals to entrust
them with protection responsibilities. Better government
regulation, monitoring, and enorcement by international
consumers o private security will help ensure that private
security works towards the stabilization o Aghanistan.
To date, regulation o PSCs in Aghanistan has been
more reactive than proactive. The Ministry o Interior
has issued operating licenses to 39 PSCs under an interim
licensing procedure designed to limit the transormationo illegal armed groups into PSCs and to prevent their
involvement in criminality. The interests o Aghan elites
and the international community have proven an obstacle
to strengthening and enorcing the existing national
regulatory and legislative ramework, though new
regulations and audits by the US Government suggest
that it may mandate more oversight o PSC contracts.
The goal should be a private security sector that is bet-
ter regulated and controlled by the Aghan govern-
ment and, critically, by the international community that
constitute their primary source o contracts and revenue.
Building a credible and accountable public security sector
is a long-term process, however; one that will not address
the immediate security needs o international and nation-
al stakeholders in Aghanistan. Nor, in the longer term, will
it completely replace the market or PSCs both by the local
and international community.
The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan 0
Executive Summary
For the purposes o this study, private securityproviders (PSPs) reers to: (i) national and internationalprivate security companies (PSCs), both licensed and
unlicensed by the Aghanistan Ministry o Interior,and (ii) armed support groups (ASGs) illegal militias
employed by international military orces.
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The absence o eective oversight and control o private
security providers (PSPs)4 employed by the international
community undermines the credibility and eectiveness
o the Aghan government, the international military and
diplomatic presence, and reconstruction organizations.
Weak regulation and enorcement also strengthen
alternative power structures, including criminal groups,
urther undermining the authority o the Aghan
government and the security o its citizens.
Militia groups employed by oreign military orces pose
an even greater regulatory challenge than private
security companies (PSCs) and do more long-term harm
to stabilization eorts in Aghanistan. Although there is
a well-dened legal ramework outlawing militia and
paramilitary groups, it is unclear whether these laws
apply to the armed support groups (ASGs) used by
oreign orces. Nonetheless, these orces are prima acie
violations o Presidential Decree 50 on demobilization
and disarmament, the Law on Firearms, Ammunition,
and Explosives, the Procedure or Regulating Activities
o Private Security Companies in Aghanistan and the
Strategy or Disbandment o Illegal Armed Groups
in Aghanistan.5 Furthermore, many o their military
commanders are responsible or human rights abuses
and are involved in criminal activities, including narcotics
tracking.
There are also visible indications that the private security
arena is better armed and better paid than their coun-
terparts in the Aghan National Security Forces (ANSF).6
While there are no concrete gures on the amount omoney spent on private security, as contracts are either
condential or cannot be substantiated, several sources
within the private security sector and the Aghan gov-
ernment estimate that 10 - 20 percent o reconstruction
unding is spent on security.9
This would amount to USD300-600 million per year, based on current Ocial Devel
opment Assistance gures; however, this gure does no
refect the ull scope o contracts rom international mili
Militia groups employed by foreign military forces pose
an even greater regulatory challenge than private security
companies and do more long-term harm to stabilization
eorts in Afghanistan.
The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan02
The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan
Center on
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Cooperation
Public Disclosure o Misconduct by
ArmorGroup North America
In September 2009, the Project on Government
Oversight (POGO) publicized gross negligence by
ArmorGroup North America (AGNA), a private security
company contracted by the US Department o State
to protect the US embassy in Kabul. Inappropriate
conduct by AGNA personnel including hazing, sexual
misconduct, and drunkenness resulted in complete
distrust o leadership and a breakdown o the chain
o command, which jeopardized the security o the
embassy.7 According to POGO, misconduct was notlimited to a ew AGNA personnel on a ew occasions;
AGNA has a record o documented, systemic contractual
violations at the US embassy. During 2007-2008, the
DoS identied numerous perormance deciencies,
including insucient numbers o guards, resulting in
sleep deprivation; poor prociency in English among
the majority o the guard orce; and victimization
o Aghan sta. A subsequent investigation by the
Senate Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight in
June 2009 ound that, despite the ailure o AGNA
to redress these shortcomings, the DoS renewed the
AGNA contract through July 2010, with an option to
extend to 2012.8 These shortcomings demonstrate
the ailure o eective oversight and its potential
consequences; the activities reported also show a
proound disrespect or local cultural and religious
norms and Aghan law, urther damaging the local
perception o PSCs and, potentially, the legitimacy o
the United States and its allies.
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The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan
tary orces, embassies, non-governmental organizations,
and the private sector. One senior Aghan government
ocial privately estimated the total spending at three
times that spent on the Aghan National Police (ANP)
and Aghan National Army (ANA) salaries.10 I correct, this
would amount to between USD 6-10 billion.
Private security adds to the cost o reconstruction in
Aghanistan. According to the World Bank, contracted
security increased the cost o highway reconstruction
projects by 3-15 percent.11 Security concerns are routinely
cited as the main impediment to implementation o
development and reconstruction projects, eectively
stunting the fow o aid.12
At the same time, amidworsening insecurity, maintaining the delivery o
reconstruction assistance across the country and the
willingness o governmental, non-governmental, and
private reconstruction organizations to deploy sta to
Aghanistan depends upon the protection services o a
range o private security entities.
Indeed, the burgeoning private security sector in
Aghanistan poses a dilemma. PSPs ulll a need or which
there is currently no clear, immediate alternative. There are
too ew ANP to provide protection to the sta, premises,
and projects o the international community and too
little condence in their ability among most internationals
to entrust them with protection responsibilities. Better
government regulation, monitoring, and enorcement
by international consumers o private security will help
ensure that it enables, rather than hinders, the stabilization
o Aghanistan.
The Private Security Phenomenon
Since 2001, the international military orces, reconstruc-
tion and development contractors, as well as embas-sies, international organizations, and businesses have
extensively utilized private security. PSPs initially served
as a surrogate or the Aghan state security sector, but
the local and international community have yet to su-
ciently alter their reliance on PSPs as these services and
structures have become available. There is a wide range o
PSPs operating in Aghanistan today: rom international
and national PSCs operating with or without the required
Aghan licensing permits, to illegal militias hired as ASGs
by international military orces.
The main services oered by PSPs in Aghanistan are:
static guarding o premises and construction projects;
close protectionl; escorting convoys; security assessment
and training; intelligence and risk management;
electronic security and surveillance; and quick reaction
orces. PSPs have also been contracted or de-mining,
poppy eradication, supporting the electoral process, andtraining Aghan security orces.13 Although there is little
public inormation, incidents like that in Kandahar in June
2009 [See box on Page 8] also suggest the use o private
security providers or black ops, including detention and
interrogation.
The United States, which has the largest military and
diplomatic presence in Aghanistan, is the largest
employer o private security in the country. The practice
o using PSCs to guard US embassies dates to the US
intervention in Haiti in 1994; using PSCs to guard military
bases was rare beore September 11, 2001, but has become
commonplace as troops have been mobilized to ght
in Aghanistan and Iraq.14 According to the Commission
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, there
were 4,373 private security personnel on US Department
o Deense (DoD) contracts and 689 US on Department
o State (DoS) contracts in March 2009.15
O these 5,062personnel, 4,402 (85 percent) were Aghan nationals.16 In
response to the deployment o additional military orces
the total number o DoD PSC personnel increased 19
percent (rom 4,373 to 5,198) as o August 2009.17
0
Better government regulation, monitoring, and
enforcement by international consumers of private
security will help ensure that it enables, rather than
hinders, the stabilization of Afghanistan.
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The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan04
US Government Private Security Contractor Sta in
Aghanistan, August 2009
Total US/
Coalition
Third
Country
National
Local/Host
Country
National
DoD PSCs18 5,198 19 264 4,915
DoS PSCs19 689 273 341 75
There are discrepancies, however. In July 2009, or
instance, a US military spokesperson stated that the US
military has 72 contracts or private security at orward
bases and other local command posts in Aghanistan,
employing 5,600 mostly Aghan civilian guards.20
Use o private security by the US in combat zones has
grown despite congressional legislation and guidance
stating that PSCs cannot undertake inherently govern-
mental unctions.21 Employment o PSCs is one aspect
o a growing trend by the US government to contract a
broad range o support services (e.g., construction, lin-
guistics, logistics, transportation). In act, the total num-
ber o DoD contractor personnel in Aghanistan (68,197)
now exceeds that o uniormed personnel (52,300). Con-
tractors comprised 57 percent o the DoDs workorce in
Aghanistan in March 2009 the highest percentage ever
used by the US in any confict.22
Afghan Regulation Initiatives
While the private security industry in Aghanistan has
grown apace with demand, regulation has been more
reactive than proactive. In mid-2007, at least 18 domes-tic and 57 international PSCs were operating in Aghani-
stan.23 In February 2008, the Aghan Ministry o Interior
(MoI) Disarmament and Reintegration Commission intro-
duced an interim licensing procedure or existing PSCs2
in an eort to limit the transormation o illegal armed
groups into PSCs and to prevent their involvement in tra
cking arms and narcotics and other criminal activity.25
All PSCs then operating in Aghanistan were notied tha
they had 45 days in which to complete their application
or a permit. The processing o applications by the Mo
High Coordination Board o Security Companies Aairs
was monitored by the United Nations (UN), the NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Com
bined Security Transition Command-Aghanistan (CSTC
A), and various embassies. MoI issued operating licenses
to 39 international and Aghan-owned PSCs, [See Annexon Page 11] eectively capping the size o the industry.2
Together these companies account or some 19,260 se
curity personnel,27 the majority o whom are locally-hired
Aghan personnel working in Kabul. 28
PSPs operating without a license have since accused
the government o avoring companies with ties to
government ocials an accusation acilitated by the
notorious corruption associated with MoI. While many o
the 39 PSCs with licenses are connected to Aghan elites
according to a ormer ocial amiliar with the process
those without licenses ailed to submit an application by
the deadline.29 Some likely assumed they would be able to
get a license through corruption. When this eventually did
not work, they began voicing concerns about the integrity
o the licensing process in order to prevent closure. 30
The PSC regulation denes the ollowing: illegal activities
or PSCs (including what might be regarded as state
unctions, e.g., border protection, securing governmen
oces); requirements or oreign and local security
companies to be issued operating and weapons licenses
terms and conditions o employment includingvetting personnel or past criminal activities and human
rights violations; guidelines or uniorms; restrictions
on procurement o equipment and ammunition; and
While the private security industry in Afghanistan has
grown apace with demand, regulation has been more
reactive than proactive.
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The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan06
weakness, the vested interests o Aghan elites and
the international community have so ar proven a key
obstacle to strengthening and enorcing the existing
national regulatory ramework or private security and,
more broadly, the presidential decree outlawing armed
groups outside o government security orces.34
Although the Aghan regulation is neither ormalized nor
comprehensive, only ty other countries have domesticpolicies relating to regulation o PSPs.35 Contracting ac-
countability on the behal o the international community
is an issue yet to be ully addressed, however. The United
States has taken several recent initiatives in an attempt to
exert greater oversight over its contracts or private secu-
rity:36
In February 2009, the DoD established the Armed
Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD) in Aghanistan
to implement contractor policies, procedures,
processes or and liaison with PSCs, as well as
to investigate incidents involving the use o orce.37
Aegis, a British PSC was contracted to run ACOD, but
with limited US Government supervision rom the US
military.38
The Special Inspector General or Aghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) announced on July 31, 2009
that it was initiating an audit on the use o private
contractors by the US DoD, DoS, and US Agency
or International Development (USAID) to provide
security or reconstruction activities.39
The DoD Interim Final Rule on the use o PSCs in
support o contingency operations, released in July
2009, is a rst step towards mandating more oversight
and ormalized procedures or PSC personne
employed by the US Government in designated
areas o combat. Implementing this policy may prove
challenging given the heavy dependence o US
activities on PSPs both within and outside the lega
parameters.40 The ongoing deployment o additiona
US and other NATO troops to Aghanistan will urthe
increase this dependence.
Employing and Empowering Illegal Militias
The Aghan government maintains that, through the PSC
licensing process, it has given conditional permission to
hire reliable and proessional private security companiesthat can adhere to Aghanistans laws and accepted
standards to provide security to the ISAF military bases
embassies, and large economic projects. 41
ISAF and US Special Forces, which operate outside o the
ISAF chain o command, employ a range o private security
providers to augment their security. Employment o PSP
enables more troops to be sent out on patrol to interact
with the local population and on combat operations
(though historically, base security in other theaters has
been perormed by military police). While ISAF and
US contingents employ licensed security companies
in some locations, the use o unregistered companies
and illegal armed support groups, with little oversight
or accountability, appears to be widespread among
international military orces.
Sources estimate that there are also as many as 1,000 to
1,500 illegal ASGs that have been employed, trained, and
armed by ISAF and Coalition Forces to provide security
to orward operating bases, escort supply convoys, and
perorm other unctions, as well as by developmen
agency contractors and provincial reconstruction teams(PRTs) to protect assistance projects.42
These security providers are requently run by orme
military commanders with ethnic, political, or kinship ties
The use of unregistered companies and illegal armed
support groups, with little oversight or accountability,
appears to be widespread among international military
forces.
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Examples o both unregistered private security
companies and armed support groups employed by
international military orces:
In Parwan province, Baghram Airbase employs a
PSC run by Asil Khan, a ormer Northern Alliance
commander allied with Haji Almas, a member o
parliament rom Parwan and ormer Northern
Alliance military commander.43
In Uruzgan province, the Australian Deense
Forces employ a 2000-strong paramilitary orce,
the Kandak Amnianti Uruzgan (Uruzgan Security
Battalion), privately run by Col. Mutiallah Khan to
provide security along the Kandahar-to-Tarin Kowt
road.44 The same company is also used by US Special
Forces.
In Kandahar province, the Canadian Forces have
contracted deense services rom Gul Agha Shirzai
(via Commando Security) and Gen. Gulalai, both
ormer military commanders. Shirzai, currently
governor o Nangarhar province, was previously
governor o Kandahar. The Canadian PRT has hired
the militia o Col. Haji Toorjan, an ally o Sherzai, to
provide camp security services.45
In Badakhshanprovince, security or the German PRT
is provided by Gen. Nazri Mahmad, a ormer Shura-
i-Nazar commander known to control a signicant
portion o the provinces lucrative opium industry.
The use o ASGs or security services is not conned to
international military orces: in the best documented
case o a PSC employing militia, US Protection and
Investigations (USPI) partnered with Northern
Alliance military commanders like General Din
Mohammad Jurat to provide their oot soldiers to the
company. USPI the American owners o which have
been ederally indicted or raud in the US has held,and continues to hold, contracts with the USAID, the
World Bank, the Japan International Cooperation
Agency, the UN, and private businesses.46
to serving and ormer government ocials and other
Aghan elite. Many are responsible or human rights
abuses and are involved in the illegal narcotics and black
market economies. In the south o Aghanistan, there is
also a tribal dimension.
PSPs are associated with the tribe o their leader, (e.g.,
Kandak Amnianti Uruzgan and its commander Matiullah
Khan with the Popalzai). In Kandahar, there are Popalzai-
and Barakzai-aliated PSPs (e.g., those linked to the Karzai
amily and Gul Agha Shirzai, respectively). 47
Rivals to State Authority
The mandate o the Coalition Forces and ISAF is to support
the Aghan government and the Aghan National Security
Forces (ANSF). However, by employing ASGs, the interna-
tional community strengthens PSP power relative to A-
ghan government institutions. The authority wielded by
the heads o PSPs surpasses that o provincial governors
and police chies, as they are better armed and unded.
This signals to the Aghan public that their security and
well-being is not a priority. Local commanders and their
militias are a primary source o insecurity or Aghan citi-
zens, as they violate basic human rights with impunity.48
Many o these PSPs continue to serve as ready-made
militias that compete with the state or otherwise
protect the power and interests o their commanders.
The employees or most private security companies
particularly registered companies based in Kabul are
hired through an open recruitment process and vetted
by MoIs Criminal Investigation Department. There isno accountability or sta o PSPs operating outside the
regulatory ramework. Moreover, illegal PSPs are generally
the most lucrative option available to ormer combatants
0
By employing armed support groups, the internation-
al community strengthens private security provider
power relative to Afghan government institutions.
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that have either been excluded rom or ailed by the
international communitys disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration initiatives.49 Many have been lured
back to PSPs, including those lead by their ormer
commanders.
Drug tracking and other criminal activities in which
commanders may be involved and or which their militiasprovide security is a lucrative source o illegal revenue
that can then be used to bribe government ocials and
strengthen shadow structures o authority. Illicit taxation
o PSPs escorting convoys and other scams on private
transport and security are also an important source o
unding or corrupt police and insurgents. The Kandak
Amnianti Uruzgan, or example, secures protection by
paying a hety toll to the policeman in charge o the
road. 50 Although it is transportation and construction
companies, both international and national, who are
the main source o protection revenue, private security
escorts also pay Taliban not to be attacked. According to
an Aghan intelligence ocial, there are examples o PSPs
paying as much as 60 percent o their gross prots or
convoy security to the Taliban and other insurgent-cum-
criminal groups or protection.51 (An international analyst
and a private security manager based in Aghanistan
thought the usual rate was likely much lower, but did not
discount the practice.)
Co-opting ormer Aghan military commanders as anti-
Taliban allies has been a centerpiece o international
military operations in Aghanistan since the 2001military intervention. The US armed and unded military
commanders many with egregious human rights
records in the initial war to overthrow the Taliban. The
existing system to protect US orces dates rom this period
As there was eectively no government and hence no
public security service commanders private militias were
hired or security. During 2003-2006, these commanders
and their militias were supposedly dismantled,52 and state
security orces established. But many o the same military
commanders still lead the same armed men in the orm o
ASGs and PSCs, licensed and unlicensed.
Today, there is an elected government, but the interna
tional community has not altered its security practices
PSPs, especially unlicensed security companies and ASGs
are dependent on short-term contracts with oreign enti
ties and have no prospect o sustainability. Hence, when
the oreign entities eventually leave or terminate theicontracts, these PSPs are likely to reocus on illegal eco
nomic activities and will ght among themselves or mar
ket share better trained and better armed than beore.
08
PSPs are generally the most lucrative option available
to former combatants that have either been excluded
from or failed by the international communitys
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
initiatives.The June 29, 2009 Kandahar Incident
The challenge posed by illegal militia groups
employed by oreign armed orces to Aghan state
authority was demonstrated on June 29, 2009, when41 Aghan nationals employed by an armed support
group (ASG) an unregistered militia orce run byUS Special Forces (SF) out o Camp Gecko in Kandahar
killed the chie o police o Kandahar province and veother police ocers. The incident occurred during a
gun battle inside a government compound ater theASG sought the release o a one o their membersarrested earlier that day. When the provincial attorney
general reused and called the Aghan National Police,the reght broke out. USSF claimed they could not
be held responsible or the actions o the ASG, but theincident raised the question o how 41 heavily armed
men and their vehicles could simply drive out o aUSSF-run base. President Hamid Karzai responded
to the killing, stating, Such incidents negativelyimpact the state-building process in Aghanistan andweaken the government. 53
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that the model the old Pashtun tribal militia system
has been corrupted by war and has no basis elsewhere
in the country, and that it thereore risks introducing
more uncontrollable armed groups and stoking ethnic
tensions.
Initial evidence suggests that the APPF is neither
prepared nor willing to tackle the insurgency. Pashtun
tribes are especially reluctant to provide young men or
ear o reprisal rom the Taliban.58 There may be a role
or these groups in combating local crime but this will
only be eective where there is stable local governance
and eective local, i not national oversight. The oversight
mechanism or the APPF has not been adequatelyestablished within the MoI prior to establishing the militia
groups. There are additional unresolved issues vetting
o members, ensuring ethnic balance, command and
control, payment, rules o engagement, policies on arrest
and detention that need to be resolved beore arming
and training additional armed groups in Aghanistan. 59
Without eective public security orces, peace is
impossible. Yet maintaining and expanding the ANSF is
prohibitively expensive or Aghanistan, which has current
annual revenue o some USD 700 million. According to the
US DoD, expanding the ANA alone will cost between USD
10-20 billion over a seven year period; recurrent costs have
been calculated at USD 2.5 billion per year or the ANA
and USD 1 billion per year or the ANP. Foreign donors,
principally the United States, supply the overwhelming
share o nancial support or ANSF.60
Building more credible public security orces is not
just a matter o greater investment. Financing armed,
alternative power structures ullls the security needs
10
o international diplomatic, military, and reconstruction
personnel in the short-term at the cost o consolidating
government authority and protecting Aghan citizens
in the long-term. Ending the impunity o powerholders
whether local or national, will increase public trust in the
state and Aghans willingness to support it in its struggle
against insurgents.
Conclusion
The majority o Aghans cannot aord private security. The
existence o a credible and accountable public security
orce, sized and trained commensurate to the scale and
nature o insecurity in Aghanistan, would mitigate theneed or international donors to contract billions o
dollars on the private security industry above all on
unaccountable illegal companies and armed suppor
groups. Investing a greater share o current private
security expenditure on the Aghan National Police would
help break the cycle o insecurity and insurgency by bette
resourcing the police, disempowering illegal militias and
other competitors to the state, and building public trus
in public security.
Nonetheless, building a credible public security secto
is a long-term process; one that will not address the
immediate security needs o international and nationa
stakeholders in Aghanistan. Nor, in the longer term
will it completely replace the market or PSCs. The role
o the ANA and ANP is not to provide static and convoy
security; placing them in that role would detract rom
their essential task o saeguarding public security and
saety and deteriorate their perormance o these
responsibilities. The goal, thereore, should be a private
security sector that is better regulated and controlled
by the government o Aghanistan and, critically, by the
international community that constitute their primarysource o contracts and revenue.
Financing armed, alternative power structures fulills
the security needs of international diplomatic, military,
and reconstruction personnel in the short-term at
the cost of consolidating government authority and
protecting Afghan citizens in the long-term.
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The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan
AEGIS
http://www.aegisworld.com/
United Kingdom
Armor Group
http://www.armorgroup.com
United Kingdom
ARGS Aghanistan
Asia Security Group (ASG)
http://www.asg.a/
Aghanistan
Kabul-Balkh Security Services
http://www.kbss.a/
Aghanistan
Burhan Aghanistan
Blue Hackle
http://www.bluehackle.com/
United Kingdom
Blackwater
http://blackwatersecurity.com/services.html
United States
Commercial Security Group Aghanistan
Compass Security
http://ozziewebs.org/compass/contact-us.htm
Australia
Control Risks Group
http://www.controlrisks.com/deault.aspx?page=495
United Kingdom
DynCorp
http://www.dyn-intl.com/
United States
Edinburgh International
http://www.edinburghint.com/
United Kingdom
EODT/GSC
http://www.eodt.com/
United States
Four Horsemen/ARC
http://www.theourhorsemeninternational.com/securitydivision.html
United States
GardaWorld
http://www.garda-world.com/
Canada
Global
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/index.html
United Kingdom
Good Knight Security Services
http://gkssecurity.com/
Aghanistan
HART Security
http://www.hartsecurity.com/
Aghanistan
IDG
http://www.idg-security.com/
United Kingdom
1
Source: Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Kabul County Council (http://kabul.osac.gov/)
Annex: Afghanistan Ministry of Interior-Registered Private Security CompaniesCountry RegisteredCompany Name
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Center on
International
Cooperation
The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan12
ISS Aghanistan
Khorasan Aghanistan
NCL Aghanistan
Olive
http://www.olivesecurity.com/
United Kingdom
PAGE Associates
http://www.pageassociates.net/services.htm
United Kingdom
Pride Security Services Aghanistan
REED Inc
http://www.reedinc.com
United States
RONCO
http://www.roncoconsulting.com/
United States
Saladin
http://www.saladin-security.com/html/aghan.shtml
United Kingdom
Siddiqi Security Aghanistan
Shield Aghanistan
SOC - Ag
http://www.soc-usa.com
Aghanistan
Strategic Security Solutions International (SSSI)
http://www.universalguardian.com/
United States
TOR Australia
Tundra SCAhttp://www.tundra-security.com/#
Aghanistan
USPI
http://uspi.us/
United States
UNITY - OSG
http://www.olympus-security.com/contact_us.html
Dubai
WATAN Risk Management
http://watanrisk.com/
Aghanistan
White Eagle Aghanistan
Annex: Afghanistan Ministry of Interior-Registered Private Security Companies continued
Source: Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Kabul County Council (http://kabul.osac.gov/)
Country RegisteredCompany Name
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End Notes
1Project on Government Oversight, POGO Letter to Secretary o State Hillary Clinton regard-
ing U.S. Embassy in Kabul, http://www.pogo.org/pogo-les/letters/contract-oversight/co-
gp-20090901.html#18.
2Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, At What Cost? Contingency
Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, Interim Report, June 2009, p. 62. http://www.
wartimecontracting.gov/images/download/documents/reports/CWC_Interim_Report_At_
What_Cost_06-10-09.pd; US Department o Deense, Contractor Support o U.S. Operations
in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Aghanistan, 3rd Quarter FY2009, www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_
vault/5A_august_3rd_qtr_2009.doc.
3For the purposes o this study, private security providers reers to: (i) national and international
private military and security companies, both licensed and unlicensed by the Aghanistan
Ministry o Interior, and (ii) armed support groups illegal militias employed by international
military orces..
4For denition o private security providers as used in this study, see ootnote 2 above.
5Illegal armed groups are dened by the ollowing Aghan laws and regulations: (i) Presidential
Decree 50 Legal Prosecution o the violators o the Disarmament and Demobilization process
(July 2004), which denes as illegal, inter alia, (1) those who maintain their armed groups, military
and paramilitary units out o Ministry o Deences structure or recruit others to do so; (2) Those
whose military structures, armed groups and other military and paramilitary ormations within
MoD structure have been dismantled, but reorganized them again;...(4)Those who entered DDR
and submitted their weapons, and later enlisted to the ormations out o the MoD.; (ii) the Law
on Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives (June 2005), which restricts those institutions that
may legally acquire, carry, keep, use, purchase, import and export rearms and ammunition to
the Ministry o Deense, Ministry o Interior, and the General Directorate o National Security; its
Article 6 (4) provides exemptions or private security companies, as dened by (iii) The Interim
Private Security Regulation (February 2008). The Strategy or Disbandment o Illegal Armed
Groups in Aghanistan urther denes as illegal a group o more than ve armed individuals
operating outside the law, drawing its cohesion rom (a) loyalty to the commander, (b) receipt o
material benets, (c) impunity enjoyed by the members, (d) shared ethnic or social background,
United Nations Development Program, Strategy or Disbandment o Illegal Armed Groups in
Aghanistan, 2006, p. 2.6Following pay reorms, the salary or ANP patrolmen is between USD 100-110 per month; private
security personnel on basic guard duty earn between USD 200-300 per month. Police salary
gures rom US Government Accountability Oce, U.S. Programs to Further Reorm Ministry o
Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack o Military Personnel and Aghan Cooperation,
March 2009, p. 37; estimates o current PSC salaries rom email communication by author with
private security ocial in Kabul, on le. See also, The Privatization o Security in Aghanistan
When nobody guards the guardians, SwissPeace, June 2007, p. 22.
7Project on Government Oversight, op. cit.
8Ibid.
9Estimates provided to author by anonymous sources within the Ministry o Interior and a private
security company, record on le with authors. This gure is consistent with security expenditures
in Iraq.
10Private comments by senior Aghan government ocial to ARP sta, on le with the authors.
11Nicole Ball, William Byrd, Peter Middlebrook, and Christopher Ward, Improving Public Financial
Management in the Aghan Security Sector, Report No. 34582-AF, (Washington DC: World Bank,
2005), p. 29.
12Oce o the Special Inspector General or Aghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), January 30,
2009 Report To Congress.
13Unpublished study on the use o private sector security providers in Aghanistan, on le with
the authors.
14Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, op. cit. p. 60.
15Ibid., p. 62.
16
Ibid.17Ibid.; US Department o Deense, Contractor Support o U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM
AOR, Iraq, and Aghanistan, 3rd Quarter FY2009.
18US Department o Deense, Contractor Support o U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR,
Iraq, and Aghanistan, 3rd Quarter FY2009.
19Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, op. cit., p. 62.
20Walter Pincus, Military Weighs Private Security on Front Lines, The Washington Post,
July 26, 2009,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/25/
AR2009072501738.html?reerrer=emailarticle. C. Zucchio, op. cit.
21See, in particular, 110th Congress, Senate Bill S. 3001, National Deense Authorization Act
or Fiscal Year 2009. http://rwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_
cong bills&docid=:s3001pcs.txt.pd and Public Law 110-417, Sec. 832, Sense o Congress
on Perormance by Private Security Contractors o Certain Functions in an Area o Combat
Operations. http://rwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_
public_laws&docid=:publ417.110.pd.
22Moshe Schwartz, Department o Deense Contractors in Iraq and
Aghanistan:Background and Analysis, Congressional Research Service. August 13, 2009.
p. 8.
23 The Privatization o Security in Aghanistan-When nobody guards the guardians,
SwissPeace, June 2007.
24In February 2008, the Procedure or Regulating Activities o Private Security Companies
in Aghanistan entered into orce. The regulation was established pursuant to the drat law
on Private Security Companies approved by the Council o Ministers in January 2008 (still
pending beore parliament) and the Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, and Explosives.
25Ibid., p. 2.
26MoI is considering procedures to raise the cap on a case-by-case basis. It is also reviewing
license applications or twelve new private security companies.
27Unocial Ministry o Interior document, PSCs that have received Temporary Registration
Licences (FINAL), dated September 21, 2008, on le with author. An alternative gure o
23,000 personnel is cited in David Zucchio, Deadly contractor incident sours Aghans,
LATimes, August 13, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-g-
aghan-contractors132009aug13,0,5499394.story. 28Unpublished study on the use o
private sector security providers in Aghanistan, on le with the authors.
29Comment provided in communication with authors.
30Over a dozen private security companies operating without a license were subsequently
shutdown. See or example, Anthony Loyd, A ride out with the Aghan fying squad on
its mission to shut down rogue security rms, The Times, October 31, 2007, http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2774227.ece.
31Author interview with MoI and UN ocials, on le with the author.
32Procedure or Regulating Activities o Private Security Companies in Aghanistan, pp.
29-30. Emphasis added.
33A Workshop with the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, International Peace Institute,
New York, July 29, 2009.
34Presidential Decree 50 Legal Prosecution o the violators o the Disarmament
and Demobilization process (July 2004). The decree criminalizes acts against the
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process and punishes individuals who
endanger the countrys security, maintain military ormations, armed groups, and othermilitary or militia units outside o the governments security orces, or recruit persons or
those purposes[.]
35PMSC Regulation Database. Geneva Centre or the Democratic Control o Armed
Forces (DCAF), July 20, 2009, http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/pmsc-regulation-
1
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database. At the international level, the UN Working Group on the Use o Mercenaries is currently
drating a convention on the regulation, oversight, and monitoring o private military and
security companies the rst o its kind but it is unclear what impact the eventual ratication
o such a convention would have at the national level. For an overview o extant national and
international regulatory mechanisms and potential models or the private security industry,
see James Cockayne et al., Beyond Market Forces: Regulating the Global Security Industry, (New
York: International Peace Institute, 2009).
36US Department o Deenses Contractor Support o U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq,
and Aghanistan, 3rd Quarter FY2009, list o improvements to management and oversight o
DoD contractors contains ourteen separate items.
37Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, op. cit., p. 74.
38Ibid. Aegis does not currently have armed personnel in Aghanistan.
39Special Inspector General or Aghanistan Reconstruction, Letter rom John Brummet, Assistant
Inspector General or Audits, OSIGAR, dated July 31, 2009, copy on le with the authors.
40Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, US Department o
Deense Interim Final Rule, July 17, 2009.
41Unpublished study on the use o private sector security providers in Aghanistan, on le with
the authors.
42Numbers independently provided to CIC by two ormer UN ocials. The United Nations
estimated in 2005 that there were nearly 5,000 militias nationwide -- upwards o 120,000
armed individuals. To date, only some 300 militia groups have been disarmed or their members
arrested. In most districts, local commanders still remain in power and beyond the law.
43Asil Khans brother reportedly owns a cement actor with extensive contracts or construction
at Baghram airbase.
44Mark Dodd and Jeremy Kelly, ADF plays down warlords role on crucial supply chain, The
Australian, April 28, 2009.
45Mike Blancheld and Andrew Mayeda, Military hires ormer Aghan ghters as security guards,
CanWest News Service, November 22, 2007; Blancheld and Mayeda, The civilian presence in
modern warare, The Ottawa Citizen, November 19, 2007.
46See The Privatization o Security in Aghanistan When nobody guards the guardians,
SwissPeace, June 2007; Daniel Schulman, The Cowboys o Kabul, Mother Jones, July 27, 2009
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/cowboys-o-kabul.
47That the chie o police and the armed support group involved in the June 29, 2009 incident in
Kandahar were rom rival tribes was a probable actor in the escalation.48See or example, Fatima Ayub, Antonella Deledda, and Patricia Gossman, Vetting Lessons or
the 2009-10 Elections in Aghanistan, Intern ational Center or Transitional Justice, New York,
January 2009.
49Disbandment o Illegal Armed Groups in Aghanistan, DIAG Evaluation, 22 April 2009, on le
with authors.
50Jeremy Kelly, The Long Road to Tarin Kowt, The Australian, April 28, 2009. According to
the article, Matiullah receives at least $US1700 a truck to ensure each convoy arrives at its
destination saely; with about 200 trucks a month going to Tarin Kowt is worth nearly USD
340,000/month.
51Private comments by senior Aghan government ocial to ARP sta, on le with the authors.
52Ater the all o the Taliban, Northern Alliance militia groups were organized into the Aghan
Military Force. This orce was the target o disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
under the Aghanistan New Beginnings Program, which ran rom 2003-2006. It was succeed by
the DIAG program, which targeted illegal, independent militias that remained.
53
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Aghan Security Guards Are Blamed in a Gun Battle That Killed a PoliceChei, New York Times, June 30, 2009. Additional details o incident provided to author by
anonymous source, record on le with authors.
54Between 2007-2009, 1,504 ANP were killed in action, compared to 568 ANA soldiers. Factbox
Aghanistan National Security Forces,Reuters, March 27, 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/
latestCrisis/idUSISL112818.
55David Kilcullen, interviewed by George Packer, Kilcullen on Aghanistan: Its Still Winnable, But
Only Just, The New Yorker, 14 November 2008, via http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs
georgepacker/2008/11/kilcullen-on-a.html.
56 To rectiy this situation, police units are now being retrained through the Focused Distri
Development program, which, though in its early stages, has shown promising results. I
February 2009, the US Department o Deence assessed 19 percent o retrained units as capabl
o conducting missions on their own and 25 percent as capable o doing so with outside suppor
But, again, without enough trainers, rolling out the program countrywide will be impossible
Government Accountability Oce, Aghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reorm
Ministry o Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack o Military Personnel and Aghan
Cooperation, March 2009.
57A letter sent to the international and national business community in Aghanistan, dated
February 9, 2008, inormed o the new security company regulations, stating Clients wishing to
hire Security Service Providers may approach the existing registered 39 companies or approach
the Ministry o Interior to provide services through the Public Guard Force at cost to the client.
Copy on le with the authors. The Public Guard Force resembles, albeit on a smaller scale and
ideally, with greater oversight and control, the Facilities Protection Service established in Iraq
ollowing its consolidation and transer to the Iraqi Ministry o Interior payroll.
58Author interviews, Kabul, April 2009. Also see CJ Radin, The Aghan Public Protection Forc
pilot program is underway, Long War Journal, March 25, 2009, via http://www.longwarjourna
org/archives/2009/03/aghan_public_protec.php; Anand Gopal, Lessons rom Iraq? US create
local militias to ght Taliban, Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 2009, via http://www.csmonito
com/2009/0413/p06s10-wosc.html; Dexter Filkins, In Recruiting an Aghan Militia, U.S. Face
Test, The New York Times, April 14, 2009, via http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/15/world
asia/15aghan.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Filkins&st=nyt.
59Author interviews, Kabul, April 2009.
60In 2005, Aghanistan spent 56.5 percent o GDP on the security sector. Eighty percent o
overall security expenditure in Aghanistan was directly executed by donors or their contractor
through the external budget, instead o going through the core budget process o the Ministry
o Finance. Ball et al., op cit., p. 23. (These gures do not represent the authorized increase in size
o ANA and ANP; as a result, the percentage o external expenditure has likely increased.)
14
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