_Boxer1948 Salvador de Sá

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Salvador Correia de s e Benevides and the Reconquest of Angola in 1648Author(s): C. R. BoxerSource: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Nov., 1948), pp. 483-513Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2507790

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T 1 ' H E HISPANIC AMERICANHISTORICALEVIEW

Vol. XXVIII November, 1948 No. 4SALVADORCORREIADE SA E BENEVIDESAND THE RECONQUESTOF ANGOLAIN 1648

C. R. BOXER*Eu sou o piratada pernade pau,de olho de vidro,da carade mau!

The refrainof this present-daypopularcariocacarnivalsongis, if I amnot mistaken,a vestigeof seventeenth-centuryBrazilianfolklore. It recalls a time when the mothers of Rio de Janeiroand Bahia usedto frightennaughtychildren nto obediencewiththreats of what would otherwisehappento them at the handsofthe dreadedDutch corsair,CornelisJol, betterknownby his nick-name of Houtbeen,Pe de Pau, or "Timber-Toe." This valorousseamanis thus perhaps better, if somewhatvicariously,remem-bered n Brazilthan in his own countrynowadays. Neverthelesshe was deservedlycelebrated n his own day and generation,hisnicknamebeing due to the fact that he had lost a leg in a navalbattle but walked more nimbly with his wooden one than mostpeopleon their owntwo feet, as the contemporaryDutch chroni-cler,De Laet,informsus. Jol wasone of the leadingsea-captainsof the Dutch West India Company,which was foundedin 1621with the avowedobjectof creatinga colonialempireon the SouthAtlantic seaboard at the expense of the Iberian settlements inSouth America.'

*The author is Cam6es Professor of Portuguese in the University of London, King'sCollege.

1 For the words of the cariocacarnival song I am indebted to my friend, Sr. Joao d'Antasde Campos, of the Casa de Portugal in London, who kindly obtained the full version fromRio. For the career of Cornelis Jol, alias Houtbeen, see pages lxxv-lxxxvi of L. C. M.Warnsinck's introduction to the fourth volume of the Linschoten Vereeniging edition ofDe Laet's Jaerlijck Verhael (Vol. XL, The Hague, 1937), and J. B. Van Overeem, "DeReizen naar de West van Cornelis Cornelisz. Jol alias Kapitein Houtbeen, 1626-1640"(reprint from De West-Indi.che Gids, XXIV [19421) and the sources there quoted.


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484 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWThis is neither the time nor the place to describe the vicissi-tudes of this curious chartered company, which like others of itskind received powerful financial and political support from its

home government, and formed virtually a state within a state,with fleets, armies, and an administrative set-up of its own. Suf-fice it to say that earlier in the eighty-years war of Holland'sindependence from Spain (1568-1648), efforts had been made toorganize the navigation, trade, and war of the Dutch in Americanwaters on the lines of what is nowadays termed a trust, pool, orcartel. These efforts were rendered abortive by the Hispano-Dutch truce of 1609-21; but when the war was renewed in thislatter year, the promoters of the scheme had more success, theDutch West India Company being formally incorporated on the3rd of June, 1621. Portuguese and Brazilian writers are usuallyinclined to characterizethis formidablecorporation,which wroughtsuch notable damage to the Iberian Atlantic possessions, as thework of Jewish capitalists, and primarily of Sephardic Jews whohad been expelled from Spain and Portugal and were anxious forrevenge on their erstwhile fellow-subjects of the Most CatholicKings. In point of fact, however, the organizer and movingspirit in the formation of the W.I.C., as embodied in 1621, wasWillem Usselinex, a Belgian refugee from Antwerp, and it waschiefly Flemish capitalists from Spanish Flanders who formed thebackbone of the company, whilst Jewish participation was on arelatively modest scale. It is true that the heretic invaders ofBrazil found a certain number of willing collaborators amongstthe resident cristdos-novos,or crypto-Jews, alias marranos or swineas they were often less elegantly termed. This is hardly surpris-ing in view of the barbarous treatment to which this unfortunateclass was periodically subjected by the Inquisition in Portugal,and the universal loathing with which they were regarded bythose of their fellow-subjects who prided themselves, howevermistakenly, on being cristdos-velhosor Old Christians, "withouttaint of Jewish, Moorish, or heretic blood." The extent of thiscollaboration has been grossly exaggerated by certain hystericalwriters, such as the Brazilian academician, Gustavo Barroso,whose anti-Semitic tirades recall the obsession of Pombal withthe Jesuits in the dreary pages of the Deducgdo chronologica.2

2 Gustavo Barroso, "O Brasil e a restauragdo de Angola," Anais da Academia Portu-guesa de Hist6ria, VII (1942), 43-69. Even odder is the same author's Hist6ria secretadoBrasil (3 vols., Sdo Paulo, 1938), which trots out the "Secret Protocols of Zion" and allthe rest of the rag-bag of conventional anti-Semitism. For the origin and progress ofthe Dutch West India Company, the standard works of P. M. Netscher, Les hollandais


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES 485The West India Company's first objective was nothing lessthan the capture of Brazil, and this was to be begun by a surprise

attack on Bahia, the capital of the colony and a flourishing settle-ment which had been founded in 1549. Subsequent develop-ments proved that even this ambitious project was not the limitof the company's dreams, nor indeed could it have been, in thenature of things. The Portuguese colonies in Brazil were agri-cultural settlements, based primarily on the production of sugar,a rapidly expanding industry because of the increasing demandfor it in Europe. Tobacco, brazilwood, and hides were the otherprincipal products of the colony, whaling being a small but flour-ishing maritime industry. Experience had shown that white laborcould not be used extensively along the tropical seaboard, andefforts to reduce the Anmerindianso slavery as field-hands hadeither failed completely or proved viciously wasteful owing tothese children of nature's pining and dying in captivity. As inthe Spanish Caribbean colonies, therefore, recourse was had toimporting Negro labor from West Africa on an ever-increasingscale, a constant supply of slaves being assured by the tribal warswhich continuously ravished the Guinea and Congo hinterland.Since Brazil could not be developed without African slave laborto work in the sugar fields and tobacco plantations, it followedthat the W.I.C. must needs secure command af the Portugueseslave-depots in West Africa as well as their Brazilian settlements.The first blow against Bahia was surprisingly successful. Afleet of twenty-five ships manned by some three thousand men.took the city with little trouble on the 8th May, 1624. Its cap-ture was facilitated, not by Jewish treachery as alleged by modernchauvinistic writers, but through the cowardice of its defenders,as is evident from the graphic account of the Jesuit padre, Ant6nioVieira, and from those of other eyewitnesses. The fugitive in-habitants and garrison,however, speedily redeemed their momen-tary weakness. Under the leadership of the local bishop, D.Marcos Teixeira, they rallied their forces in the bush to organizeau Bresil (The Hague, 1853) and H. Witjen, Das Hollandische Kolonialreich in Bresilien(Berlin, 1921), may be supplemented by reference to G. Edmundson's articles on "TheDutch Power in Brasil" in the English Historical Review (XI, XIV, XV, and XVIII[London, 1896-1900]). Edmundson has made full use of Spanish and Portuguese sourcesunknown to his predecessors. Further see S. P. L'Honor6 Naber and Warnsinck'sscholarly edition of the Jaerlijck Verhael of Johannes de Laet (4 vols., The Hague, 1929-1937). Far and away the best concise review of this subject is Naber's essay, De WestIndische Compagnie n Brazilie en Guinee (The Hague, 1930), to which stimulating lecturethe present writer acknowledges his indebtedness.


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486 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWan effective guerrilla campaign which prevented the Dutch fromextending their occupation a yard beyond the range of their can-non.

One of the reasons for the W.I.C.'s selection of Brazil ratherthan the Caribbean colonies as the first point of attack was (inall probability) the idea that the Spanish government would reactless strongly to the loss of a Portuguese possession than to one oftheir own. This natural surmise proved to be mistaken. Theshock of the loss of Bahia, with its potential threat to the Spanishsettlements in the Rio de la Plata and elsewhere, galvanized eventhe sluggish Philip IV into action. A large combined Hispano-Portuguese fleet under the command of Don Fadrique de Toledowas fitted out with remarkable promptitude, and Bahia was re-captured on 1st May, 1625, a year (less a week) after the dateof its fall.Meanwhile the Dutch had not forgotten the corollary to theirscheme for the occupation of Brazil, that of securing the Portu-guese slave depots in Africa. Three months after the fall of Bahiain May, 1624, the famous Admiral Piet Heyn left the Bay of AllSaints for Angola. He found the Portuguese at Luanda on theirguard, however, and was forced to return empty-handed. On hisway back, he put into the Brazilian captaincy of Espiritu Santowith a view to obtaining supplies, but his landing force was worstedin a river fight with a detachment commanded by Salvador Correiade Sa e Benevides, son of the governor of Rio de Janeiro, who wason his way up the coast with reinforcements for the besiegers ofBahia. Piet Heyn likewise sailed on to Bahia, where finding thesuperior Hispano-Portuguese armada blockading the port, he leftfor Holland without attempting anything more. Meanwhile an-other powerful Dutch fleet of nineteen sail had appeared off thePortuguese Castle of Sio Jorge da Mina (St. George of the Mine)in October, 1625, with the object of capturing this oldest Euro-pean settlement in West Africa, which was likewise an importantslave-depot. A force of 1200 men was landed near the castle,but was surprisedand routed whilst resting in the afternoon heat,over four hundred headless Dutch corpses being left lying on thesand. The contemporary Dutch chronicler, Caspar Barlaeus,ascribes this disaster to the negligence of the commanders, add-ing with justifiable irony, "and in true military fashion each onethrew the blame on the other."3

3Caspar Barlaeus apud Naber's Dutch translation published in 1923, under the titleof Nederlandsch Brasilig onder het Bewind van Johan Maurits van Nassau, 1637-1644.This account is confirmed by the contemporary Portuguese version published in pamphletform at Lisbon in 1627.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES 487A good beginning in May, 1624, had thus ended disastrouslyfor the Dutch fifteen months later, and all their grandiose schemeof conquest had gone up in smoke. But the stubborn Calvinistsby the North Sea were not easily deterred once they had set theirhand to the plow. They now turned their efforts in anotherdirection, namely towards intercepting the treasure fleet from theSpanish Main in the Caribbean. A preliminary effort by PietHeyn failed in 1626, for the Spanish armada encountered provedtoo strong to be brought to action; but good luck and good judg-ment brought the same admiral a glittering reward in 1628, whenthe silver fleet from Mexico was captured intact, and virtually

without a shot being fired, in the Cuban harbor of Matanzas.All Holland went wild with joy at this bloodless but profitableexploit, which is still remembered whenever Hollanders gathertogether on carnival occasions, in the tuneful strains of Joost VanVondel's Triomf-lied. Of more immediate importance was thefact that the twelve million guilders worth of booty put thefinancially tottering West India Company squarely on its feet,and enabled it to tackle with renewed vigor its design for theconquest of Brazil.This time, however, the company resolved to take more thanone bite at the cherry. Bahia was on its guard, and it wasthought that the more northerly dependency of Pernambucowould prove an easier prey. A fleet of over thirty ships andeight thousand men captured the settlement together with theneighboring town of Olinda after a hard struggle in May, 1630,when Recife de Pernambuco became the headquarters of Nether-lands Brazil. The Iberian government could not react as stronglyto this loss as it had done to that of Bahia six years before, since

the central treasury was empty, the Portuguese home fleet hadbeen destroyed in a disastrous shipwreck in the Bay of Biscay in1627, and the Iberian colonial empire was on the defensive fromManila to Mazagao. Nevertheless both Lisbon and Madrid didwhat they could, and a substantial if intermittent stream of rein-forcements was dispatched to Brazil. But the stars in theircourses seemed to be fighting against them; and all their effortsnot only failed to dislodge the Dutch from their foothold in Per-nambuco, but could not prevent the tenacious Hollanders fromextending it.The apogee of Netherlands Brazil was reached in the goldendays of Prince Johan Maurits of Nassau, a great-nephew ofWilliam the Silent, who governed the colony with distinction for


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488 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWseven years (1637 to 1644). The prince had early realized thatwithout the occupation of Bahia, there could be no permanentsecurity for Pernambuco against potential Portuguese attacks,and he therefore endeavored to carry the Portuguese headquartersby storm in 1638. In this he narrowly failed, but he atoned ingreat measurefor this setback by extending the bounds of Nether-lands Brazil over most of the northeast seaboard from the Maran-hao to Sergipe; whilst he took the first step to secure the neces-sary slave-depots in West Africa by his successful conquest ofElmina in 1637, where his predecessors had failed so miserablytwelve years before. In January, 1640, his sea-captains decisive-ly defeated a large combined Luso-Spanish fleet which was makinga final effort to retake Pernambuco. December of that yearsaw the successful revolt of Portugal from Spain at the end ofsixty years "Babylonian" captivity, and the accession of the Dukeof Braganza as King Dom JoAo IV.4The tidings of Portugal's independence were received by theDutch in 1641 with very mixed feelings. On the one hand theywelcomed the dismemberment of the Iberian colonial empire asweakening their hereditary enemy, Spain, with whom they werestill at war, albeit the fighting was being conducted in an in-creasingly fitful and halfhearted fashion; it had long been clearthat Spain had no earthly chance of reconquering the UnitedProvinces and merely persisted in fighting a losing battle out offalse pride. On the other hand, formal recognition of Portugal'snew-won independence would deprive the Dutch of the very prof-itable predatory attacks which they were making on the Lusi-tanian colonies from the Moluccas to the Maranhao, and which,if continued or intensified, threatened to bring about the completecollapse of the Lusitanian overseas empire in the near future, inview of the undisputed Dutch mastery of the seas. Broadlyspeaking, the States-General took the standpoint that it was

4 Cf. Naber's editions of De Laet and Barlaeus quoted in the previous two notes; alsoWarnsinck, "Een mislukte Aanslag op Nederlandsch Brazili6, 1639-1640," De Gids(February, 1940). Durval Pires de Lima ("Temas do Brasil colonial," Anais da Aca-demia Portuguesa de Hist6ria, VII [19421) proves by copious quotation from unpub-lished papers in the Arquivo Hist6rico Colonial at Lisbon that Philip IV and Olivaresmade far greater efforts to help Brazil than most Portuguese writers are willing to givethem credit for. Portuguese accounts of the (for them) disastrous naval actions ofJanuary, 1640, in the standard works of the Conde de Ericeira, Portugal restaurado, I;Costa Quintella, Anais da marinha portuguesa, II (Lisbon, 1840); Adolfo Varnhagen,Historia das lutas com os holandesesno Brasql (Lisbon, 1872); and Admiral A. Botelho deSousa, Subsidios para a hist6ria das guerrasda restauragaono mar e no alem mar (Lisbon1940).


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE Sk E BENEVIDES 489better to weaken Spain by acknowledging and respecting Portu-guese independence forthwith, whereas the East and West IndiaCompanies, and the powerful interests they represented, naturallypreferred to continue their profitable career of aggression againstthe tottering Portuguese colonies. As usual a compromise wasreached, whereby it was agreed to make a truce (not a peace)with Portugal for ten years; but pending the ratification of theterms, the directors of the East and West India Companies wroteto their subordinates overseas to seize all the Portuguese colonialterritory which they could before the truce became effective.This strictly legal but morally disloyal attitude of a strongernation to a weaker is not defended by any Dutch historian today;but it may be pleaded in extenuation that the Hollanders werenot the only people who indulged in such manifestations of Real-politik-either then or later. In any event, Prince Johan Mauritshad his orders-which doubtless squared well enough with hisown inclination-and he lost no time in acting on them. Hisexperience of 1638 had shown him that Bahia was "not the kindof cat to be taken without gloves," and he decided to utilize hisavailable forces in an attack on the Portuguese slave-depot ofSdo Paulo de Luanda in Angola. Capture of this place wouldachieve the double object of securing an adequate slave-marketfor Netherlands Brazil, whilst simultaneously depriving the Portu-guese (and Spaniards) of their main source of supply. More-over, slaves from this part of West Africa were generally regardedas more tractable and hard-working than those from the Guineahinterland who were exported through Elmina. The expeditionwas to be rounded off by the capture of the island of Sdo Tom6,which despite its perennial unhealthiness was a source of supplyfor both slaves and sugar.5The expedition which left Recife bound for Angola on the30th May, 1641, consisted of twenty-one ships manned by threethousand men under the command of the indefatigable Cornelis

5It is amusing to note that Prince Johan Maurits' observation that Bahia was "eenkat, die niet sonder hantschoenen mach aengetast werden," is an exact echo of AdmiralCornelis Maatelief's rueful remark after his failure to take Malacca in 1606, that it "gheenkatte en is om wonderhantschoene te vangen." The expedition of Jol to Angola andSao Tomd has recently been described in detail in an excellent article by K. Ratelband,"De Expeditie van Jol naar Angola en Sao Thomd, 30 Mei 1641-31 October 1641,"reprinted from De West-IndischeGids, XXIV (1943), which supersedes all previous ver-sions. The author spent several years in Angola and is thus not only personally acquaintedwith the terrain but has made full -use of Cadornega, Historia das guerras angolanas, andother contemporary Portuguese accounts. Needless to say, I have followed him closely inmy own account, which will serve for those who cannot read Dutch.


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490 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWJol-Houtbeen, or P6 de Pau. The troops were under the com-mand of an English mercenary soldier named Henderson; and acertain Pieter Moorthamer (or Mortamer) was earmarked as thedirector of the potential possession. The voyage proved an un-expectedly difficult one, probably because the Brazil currentproved much stronger than usual. Ten weeks were taken on thecrossing, since the African shore (at Mossamedes) was not sighteduntil the 9th of August, by which time there was only a week'ssupply of the much-reduced water-ration on hand. The fleet firstwatered in the Bero River, which by a fortunate chance happenedto be fairly full that year, instead of bone-dry as is usual in August.It then resumed the voyage to Luanda, off which it appeared themorning of the 23rd August, to the great consternation of theinhabitants, albeit not to the surprise of the governor, PedroC6sar de Meneses, who was on his guard.Houtbeen now found out that nobody on board the fleet knewthe entrance to the harbor, not even the skipper of the Charitaswho had been there the year before, and had drawn a sketch-map of the harbor as he recollected it. The admiral and his col-leagues were thus undecided where or how to land, when theirdoubts were resolved by the opportune appearance of two of theirships with a prize, the Jesu'sMalriaJose',bound from the Canarieswith 160 pipes of wine. The Spanish master of this ship-prob-ably to be revenged on his erstwhile Portuguese fellow-subjectsfor breaking free from Spain-made no bones whatever aboutshowing the Hollanders the narrow passage through the northernentrance to the harbor. He also indicated to them where theycould land in the roadstead on a beach midway between twoPortuguese forts. Incredible as it may seem, this beach was be-yond the range of the cannon of either of them. This opportuneintelligence enabled Houtbeen and Henderson to disembark theirmen here on the morning of the 25th. The Portuguese, who neverdreamed that their weak spot would be revealed, beat a hasty re-treat after offering only a token resistance. The defenders ofthe city were now seized with panic, like those of Bahia had beenin 1624. Thinking that the Dutch had merely come on a plunder-ing privateer voyage and not to stay, they evacuated the placeduring the night of August 25-26, taking with them what goodsand chattels they could carry a few miles up country to awaitthe expected departure of the enemy.When the Hollanders entered the empty town on the morningof August 26th, they were surprised to find it "a great and fair


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES 491city, containing about five thousand great and fair stone housesless or more, in the bigness of the city of Olinda," to say nothingof its "five castles and seven batteries whereon stood planted about130 guns including sixty brass pieces." Twenty sail of shipsgreat and small were taken in the harbor, together with largestores of various kinds in the magazines. This virtually blood-less occupation cost the Dutch only three men, and the Hollanderswere astonished to find so extensive and well-built a city, withspacious convents, churches, and a Jesuit college, where they hadevidently expected a sordid and squalid slave-mart of mud hutsand thatched roofs. Well might one of the Dutch participantsin this expedition write to a friend in Holland that "It is to beadmired that they have so slightly delivered up and forsaken sobrave a city with invincible forts, which hath been of great im-portance to their King, because he brought from thence all theNegroes and Blackmoors which they had need of and employedin all quarters; and being we have now the said place in our ownhands, Spain and Portugal itself will have great want of negroes.It is a place of great traffic and negotiation, which hath been ofthe highest importance to the King of Spain."6

The same jubilant note over this potential haul of "blackivory" is struck in another of the contemporary letters printed in1642, which further explains how the profit was made: "This is agreat victory, because the King of Castile can get no Negroes orBlackmoors to labor in the mines in the West Indies, whether-wards they have yearly sent from that place about 15,000, whichthey buy there for a small price and are sold here in Brazil, for400 or 500 guilders one negro; and in the West Indies they aresold for a yet higher price: out of which trade the King of Castilehath yearly had a great treasure, which he must miss now, be-6 A Little True Forraine Newes Better Than a GreatDeale of Domestic Spurious FalseNewestPublished Daily Without Feare or Wit, to the Shame of the Nation and Beyond theLibertyof Paris Pasquils (London, 1641). This is one of the few contemporary sourceson the capture of Luanda which has apparently escaped Mr. Ratelband's eagle eye. Al-though the title page bears the imprint 1641, this is an obvious slip for 1642, since thefirst page begins, An Extract out of divers letters written in Brazil, concerning the gloriousVictory of the taking of the great and populous Citie of Loanda de S. Paulo in Angola: Bythe fleet of the GenerallWest India Company,under thecommand of the Admiral Houtebeeneor Wooden-legge,which was done the 26th of August 1641. Imprinted at Middelburgh,bythe Widow and Heirs of Simon Mowlers ... 1642. It should be added that Jol took SioTom6 in October, 1641, although only after he had sustained heavy losses in besiegingthe fort of Sao Sebastiao, whose heroic defense against great odds affords a striking con-trast to the cowardice of the defenders of Luanda. Jol died of malaria soon afterwardsand was buried in the local church, through which the equator ran, according to tradition.


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492 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWcause he had for every negro, ten cruzados customs, besides othergreat Revenues." The general accuracy of this is confirmed byother contemporary Portuguese and Dutch sources, albeit theNegroes were not usually sold singly but in lots of two, three, ormore, known in Portuguese as pega,whence the Dutch stuckliter-ally "piece"); and the prices quoted are applicable to these peasor "lots" rather than to individual Negroes. Friar Manoel Cala-do, writing in 1648, alleges that the Dutch, after their dominanceof the Angola slave-export market, deliberately gave the wretchedNegroes sea-water to drink on board the slave-ships, so that theywould die soon after being sold to the Portuguese fazendeiros ofoccupied Brazil. These were thus forced to buy more at equallyhigh prices (three hundred patacas or silver dollars is the averagehe gives) from the monopolists of the W.I.C.This allegation is self-evidently ridiculous, since the Negroeswould not have survived to reach land if given sea-water to drinken route; but that conditions on board the Dutch slavers wereeven worse than those in Portuguese or Brazilian vessels can begathered from the report of Pieter Moorthamer, the first Nether-lands director of the colony, drawn up after a year of Dutchoccupation in September, 1642. After describing the differentgradings and categories of peas, into which the slaves were classi-fied, he continues: "The Portuguese succeed better in bringingover 500 slaves in a caravel, than we do with 300 in a large ship.This is because the Portuguese look after and feed them better,which brings them a two-fold return at the time of sale. Theywash down the deck every other day with bad vinegar; they cookwarm hot-pot for their slaves twice daily, oncewith African beans,the next time with maize, and all well cooked with a good bigspoonful of palm-oil mixed therein, together with a little salt, andsometimes a large hunk of dried fish in each dish. During theday, they have always a little farinha and some water, whilstthey have a little nigger-wine especially on hand for the sick, andgive every slave two or three pieces of old cloth to cover himselfwith." Moorthamer also advocated the construction of barra-coons at Luanda for the housing of slaves awaiting shipment,"like each Portuguese has attached to his private dwelling, andthus the slaves will come fit on board, remain fit on the voyage,and if the crossings are quicker, they will fetch half as much againin the market; nor will one then hear so much of their dying, orjumping over-board, or killing themselves as they do now."Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, and English are all equally to


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES 493blame for their share in this degrading traffic but (if only becausethey were the more experienced),the Portuguese were evidentlythe most efficient, and thus relatively the most humane of themall.7Enough has been said to show that possession of Angola asthe coveted source of "black ivory" was essential to the nationwhich desired to exploit the sugar and tobacco cultivation inBrazil. The loss of Luanda was therefore a severe blow to thetottering Portuguese colonial empire, of which Brazil was by nowthe only profitable portion, if we except sporadic benefits derivedfrom Macau and Mozambique. It is true that all was not yetentirely lost, since the Portuguese still retained a tenuous holdon some districts in the interior from their bases at Muxima andMassangano. But the Dutch speedily consolidated their hold onthe colony's littoral by occupying Benguela and the mouth ofthe River Kwanza (Quanza), thus effectively controlling the sea-board, and preventing the exportation of slaves save throughtheir hands. The ten-years' uneasy truce concluded betweenHolland and Portugal was now belatedly-and incompletely-enforced in Angola, where the Portuguese in the interior werecompelled to trade with the Hollanders at Luanda to secure thenecessities of life. The Dutch in their turn had to make a dealwith the Portuguese, to ensure getting a sufficient number ofslaves. The Lusitanian position daily worsened, however, sincethe Dutch encouraged the Negroes to revolt against their formermasters, and the majority of the tribes gradually came over tothe side of the intruders.Nevertheless, the treacherous siezure of Luanda in August,

7 Naber, "Nota van Pieter Mortamer over het gewest Angola (1642)," Moorthamer(as his name is usually written elsewhere) was the first director of the colony and hisexceedingly valuable report was printed by Naber under the above title in the Bijdragenen Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschapgevestigd te Utrecht, Deel LIV (1933)(hereinafter cited as Bijdragen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht). See also Frei ManuelCalado, 0 valerosoLucideno (ed. Sao Paulo, 2 vols., 1945), I, 249-250. Dirck Ruyters inhis Toorste der Zee-Vaert of 1623, relates how a Portuguese slave-dealing friend of his inBrazil showed him that he had made a clear profit of the equivalent of 31,000 Rijks-dollarson a cargo of five-hundred Angola slaves landed at Bahia. He was assured that theprofits of the slave trade in the Spanish West Indies were even higher. Another Dutchnarrative of circa 1640 estimates that the slave trade at Luanda was worth 6,600,000florins yearly, whilst 15,430 Angola Negroes were landed at Pernambuco alone in theyears 1620-1623. For further facts and figures on the slave trade between West Africaand Ibero-America, see Witjen, op. cit.; Albuquerque Felner, Angola (Coimbra, 1933),pp. 79, 135-139, 166-169, 255ff; J. L. d'Azevedo, Ppocas de Portugal econ6mico (Lisbon,1929), pp. 72-79, 236-237, 256, 266ff; Durval Pires de Lima. op. cit., pp. 257, 282, 315;Cadornega, op. cit., III, 221.


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494 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW1641, proved a Pyrrhic victory for the Dutch in the long run; foralthough the immediate and material benefits were great, theywere eventually more than offset by the natural reaction of thePortuguese. They were understandably bitter over the wholebusiness, and all the more since their colonial economy as well astheir national prestige were adversely affected. They regardedthemselves henceforth as free to pay the Dutch in the same coin,and this intensified, if it did not originate, the support given bythe home government, at first secretly and later openly, to therebellions against Dutch rule which broke out successively in theMaranhdo (1642) and Pernambuco (1645). These revolts intheir turn further exasperated the Hollanders, and thus a viciouscircle of reprisals and counter-reprisals was started. The Maran-hao rebellion provided the Angola Dutch with a pretext fortreacherously attacking the local Portuguese at Gango, wheremost of the refugees from Luanda had settled, in May, 1643.Amongst the prisoners was the ex-governor, Pedro Cesar deMeneses, and although he subsequently escaped from jail atLuanda, and even renewed the local truce with the Hollanders,neither side had any longer the slightest confidence in the plightedword of the other.8Chief amongst the Hollanders' native allies was the famousQueen N'Zinga (also written Ginga, Singa, etc.), a sort of duskyZenobia, who although a Christian convert early and late in herlong and eventful life, for most of it relapsed into a hedonisticheathendom. She was a thorn in the side of the Portuguese formany years, and proved doubly formidable with the arms andmunitions supplied by the Dutch. Like Houtbeen or P6 de Pau,her fame survives in modern Brazilian folklore in several versesof the celebrated Auto dos congos, so popular in Ceara and theNortheast:

8 The best Dutch account of the tragic events in Angola in 1641-1645 is contained inNaber's introduction to the "Nota" of Pieter Moorthamer in the Bijdragen HistorischGenootschap Utrecht for 1933. Portuguese accounts are legion, but the traditional ver-sions of the Conde de Ericeira, Cadornega, and other contemporary writers should besupplemented by the documents published in the Arquivos de Angola, 2a serie, which areresumed on pp. 13-26 of the off-print, "Angola: Principais datas da cronologia luso-holan-desa (1621-1648)" (Luanda, 1945). Cf. also the articles in the Publicaguesdo Congressodo Mundo Portugues, IX (Lisbon, 1940). The reaction of the troubles in Angola andBrazil on the diplomatic negotiations between Portugal and Holland in 1641-1648 canbe traced in the Correspondenciade Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, the Portuguese envoyat the Hague, edited in two volumes by Edgar Prestage and P. Azevedo (Coimbra, 1920-1926).


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES 495Sou irmaio da Rainha GingaAfilhado da Virgem MariaAlmirante de HolandaEmbaixador da Turquia!

Meanwhile the government at Lisbon, preoccupied as it was withthe perennial Spanish threat across the border, and by urgentdemands for men, money, and ships from every quarter of itsvast overseas empire from the Maranhdo to Macau, endeavoredto do something to help the staunch remnant of Portuguese fight-ing a losing battle in the interior of Angola. Unfortunately thatsomething was inevitably too little if not too late, whilst thedifficulties were further enhanced by the imperious necessity ofavoiding an open break with Holland. The first expedition of215 men, mostly veterans of former campaigns in Angola, wasorganized in Bahia, and disembarked in the roadstead of Quicom-bo (roughly half-way between Luanda and Benguela and whichhad not been occupied by the Dutch) in April, 1645. On theoverland trek to Massangano they were intercepted by a horde ofthe cannibalistic Jagas, and the majority were "made food forthese savages and buried in their bellies" as a contemporary nar-rative sorrowfully expressed it. The second expedition was like-wise organized in Brazil, this time at Rio, consisting of about threehundred men who reached Benguela in June of the same year,whence they proceeded to Quicombo. After being joined thereby the survivors of the Bahia expedition and a number of refugeesfrom Benguela, they went by sea and land respectively to theSuto and Kwanza rivers, whence the majority eventually reachedMassangano at the end of 1645.9With their welcome if scanty and belated reinforcements, thelocal Portuguese took the offensive against Queen N'Zinga's rebel-lious tribes in 1646. A preliminary campaign was eminently suc-cessful, the queen's sister, Dona Barbara, being taken prisoner,although the redoubtable Amazon herself escaped to fight againanother day-and most effectively too. A Dutch attack on thePortuguese post of Muxima this year likewise miscarried, butthese two successes were more than off-set by two crushing dis-

I Cf. the article on the expeditions of 1645 by GastAo Sousa Dias (Publicaguesdo Con-gresso do Mundo Portugus, VII [1940], 337ff; and "Angola: Principais datas da cronologialuso-holandesa (1621-1648)," loc. cit., pp. 29-37. For the Dutch version, cf. Naber'sedition of Pieter Moorthamer's "Nota." A version of the "Auto dos congos" with otherreferences to Queen N'Zinga will be found on pp. 50-62 of Barroso's article, "O Brasil e arestauragao de Angola, " loc. cit., but he ignores Borges de Madureira's defeat and deathin 1647.


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496 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWasters in 1647-48. In the first of these (October, 1647), the Dutchdirector, Cornelis Ouman, with the help of Queen N'Zinga, an-nihilated a Portuguese column under one of their best bush-war-fare veterans, Gaspar Borges Madureira. In the second (August,1648), a flying column of 220 Hollanders under Major SymonPieterszoon, with the aid of native auxiliaries supplied by QueenN'Zinga and the king of the Congo, annihilated another columnof 120 Portuguese and loyal natives under Manoel de N6brega.This final blow was seemingly the death-knell of the Portuguesein Angola, but at the last minute of the eleventh hour deliverancewas at hand.'0

The manifold preoccupations of King John IV with the Span-iards and Dutch in four continents did not prevent him and hisOverseas Council (Conselho Ultramarino) from periodically con-sidering ways and means to deal with the situation in Angola,although in Portugal's plight it was easier to discuss ways thanto find means. Amongst the leading fidalgos whose opinions wereasked was Salvador Correia de SA e Benevides, a cariocaconquis-tador (if I may so express it) born at Rio de Janeiro in 1594, of aPortuguese father, Martim de Sa, scion of the founding fathers ofthe City of Sdo Sebastiao, and a Spanish mother, Maria de Men-doza y Benevides, daughter of Manuel de Mendoza y Bene-vides, governor of Cadiz, and his wife, who descended from anEnglish lady related to Jane Dormer, the Duchess of Feira. Sal-vador Correia de Sa e Benevides had an eventful career from hisyouth, since he had soldiered in Paraguay, convoyed the sugarships from Rio, Bahia, and Pernambuco to Lisbon on various oc-casions, and (as we have seen) defeated the redoubtable Piet Heynat Sdo Vicente, on his way to the siege of Bahia in March, 1625.He had further made the overland trek to Peru to find a wife in theshape of a comely (and wealthy) Spanish lady named Catalina deVelasco. Despite the fact that he had a Spanish wife and mother,in March, 1641, he had loyally acclaimed Dom Joao IV as kingat Rio de Janeiro, of which city he was hereditary constable andgovernor, besides holding the post of "general" of the Brazilfleets. He was thus qualified to suggest that the leader of theproposed expedition to Angola should be a "pessoa que tenhacursado conquistas e navegaqoes porquanto a terra he doentia e

10 Naber's article in Bijdragen Historisch GenootschapUtrecht (1933) and the documentsprinted in the Arquivos de Angola (2a serie, II, No. 8 [October, 1944], 149-164), whichcontain the sworn testimony of the twelve Portuguese survivors of the last disaster (whenN6brega's flying column was destroyed by the Dutch and Queen N'Zinga's forces) astaken on oath at Luanda on 30 August-2 September, 1648.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA! E BENEVIDES 497a jornada ndo pede descanso." It is probable that he had him-self in mind, since he later wrote (12 September 1647), "Senhor,eu desejo servir e ha 32 anos que o fago, passando a linha 18 vezes,e a andar no mar e ser bem afortunado nele, ndo dou ventagem aninguemn m Portugal; sempre dei boa conta de min.""1However this may be, it is interesting to note that one of hisrecommendations in 1643 was to the effect that the commanderof the expedition should be supplied with two sets of orders; oneofficial document authorizing him to land at the mouth of theRiver Bengo or elsewhere, but orderinghim to avoid all hostilitieswith the Dutch; and secret instruction in which "Your Majestycan order what you think best for your service, since war is amatter of stratagems and they [the Dutch] have used many."He further pointed out that a lot could be done by workingthrough Indian or Negro auxiliaries, "when we will have ourexcuses readily obvious." When the tone of Salvador's sugges-tion of 1643 is compared with what actually transpired five yearslater, it seems more than likely that he was then in fact providedwith an open and a secret set of instructions of diametricallyopposite tenor, as he himself had suggested.The critical situation of the Portuguese in the Angola hinter-land finally resulted in the nomination of Salvador Correia de Sae Benevides as governor and captain-general of the colony inApril, 1647, although his formal letters-patent to this post werenot dispatched by the Royal Chancery until five months later.Preparations to scrape together a sufficient force of men and shipsfor him had begun early in that year; but he had the greatestdifficulty in getting even part of his allocations fulfilled, owingto the chronic penury of the Royal Treasury and the diversionto other quarters of ships and supplies originally allotted to him.As late as 12 September, we find Salvador complaining that nota single one of his promised eight hundred troops had been en-listed. In the end, it seems that only about 250 actually sailed

11The literature on Salvador Correia de S6 e Benevides is legion, arid I shall contentmyself with referringto three recent works wherein the reader will find adequate referencesto all previous books and articles on the subject: JuilioCaiola, "A reconquista de Angolapor Salvador Correia de S6," Publicadoes do Congresso do Mundo Portugues, IX (1940),423ff; Rodrigues Cavalheiro, "A colaboragAo da metr6pole na reconquista do Brasil,"ibid., pp. 289-335, which despite its title, deals in point of fact primarily with the organiza-tion of Correia's Angola squadron in 1647; Clado Ribeiro de Lessa, Salvador Correiade Sae Benevides (Lisbon, 1940); and more recently, Luis Norton, A dinastia dos Sds no Brasil(Lisbon, 1943). None of these authors nor their predecessors, Afr~nio Peixoto, Forjaz deSampaio, Gastdo de Sousa Dias, etc., have made more than a superficial use of Dutchsources. Thus their works inevitably suffer from a certain lack of balance as regardsthe background of the Angola episode, which it is hoped is corrected in the present essay.


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498 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWwith the squadron, most of them Brazilian-born and veterans ofthe Pernambuco, Angola, and Alemtejo campaigns, albeit thegeneral complained later that they were the sweepings of theLisbon jail and soldiery. The money for the fitting-out of thissquadron was furnished by a syndicate of local Jews (includingDuarte de Silva) who were given as security for repayment ofthe sums they advanced a lien on several royal taxes and impostsat Rio de Janeiro. The preparation of this armament for Angolawas further complicated by the necessity of providing a strongarmada for Brazil, in consequence of alarmingintelligence receivedfrom Bahia in the spring of 1647.12The strategic position of Netherlands Brazil had deterioratedsharply after the departure of Prince Johan Maurits in May, 1644.The successful revolt of the Maranhdo had been followed by thewidespread Pernambuco uprising, organized by Jodo FernandesVieira and supported by Andr6 Vidal de Negreiros, who hadostensibly been sent from Bahia to stop it. Vieira's victoriesat the Monte das Tabocas and Casa Forte in August, 1645, hadbeen to some extent offset by Admiral Lichthart's destruction ofJer6nimo Serrdode Paiva's squadron in Tamandar6 Bay in Sep-tember, but the whole hinterland remained in the hands of therebels. Strong reinforcements were sent out from Holland onreceipt of the news of Vieira's rising. On their arrival in 1646,the Hollanders occupied the mouth of the river Sdo Francisco,with the idea of cutting off Vieira's line of communication withBahia. This had only a momentary success, since the Luso-Brazilians soon cut other paths through the bush farther inland,beyond reach of the Dutch fleet or fort, so the expedition waswithdrawn early in 1647, after Lichthart had died from fever.The Dutch now returned to Prince Johan Maurits' idea of attack-ing the enemy at his strongest but likewise most vital spot, Bahia.The fleet and reinforcements which came out with CouncilorHendrik Haecxs, Admiral Haultain, and Colonel Von Schoppein 1646, brought with them instructions to land on the island ofItaparica, "lying right opposite Bahia, richly supplied with sugar-mills and cattle, and to occupy it with the object of founding therethe equivalent of a new Dunkirk."'13

12 Salvador's atent as governor f Angola s printed n the Arquivos eAngola, a serie,II, No. 8 (1944), 111-112. It is perhapsworthnothing that is specificallyaddressed othe municipalauthoritiesof the City of Luanda nter alia. The date of his nominationwas 8 April; hat of his patent, 20 September, 647.

13 Cf. Naber, "Het Dagboekvan Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Road vanBrazilie (1645-1654)," Bijdragen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht, Deel XLVI (1925), apriceless ource orthe last decadeof Dutch Brazilwhichhas apparentlybeenoverlookedby all Portugueseand BrazilianwriterswhoseworksI have consulted.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES 499It was realized that Schoppe's two thousand men would beinsufficient to carry Bahia by a coup-de-main, as the failure of

Maurits' attempt in 1638 had shown. But it was thought thatsince the Dutch had uncontested command of the sea, their oc-cupation of Itaparica would ensure so effective a blockade of Bahiathat the city, cut off from the outer world, would eventually fallof itself like a rotten apple. Moreover, Vidal's forces would per-force have to return from Pernambuco to defend the capital, thuseasing the pressure on Recife. This strategy had long been advo-cated by Sigismund von Schoppe, the German commander inchief of the Dutch forces, and it was no secret to the Portuguese,for Padre Ant6nio Vieira had expressed his fears of it to KingJohn IV, some six months before the event. When the kingreceived the news of Schoppe's landing, he sent forthwith for theJesuit early in the morning and said to him, "You are a prophet;last night a carvel came from Bahia ... with the news thatSigismund has fortified himself in Itaparica. What do you thinkwe should do now?" The sequel is well known, and suffice it tosay that the indefatigable Vieira negotiated a loan from someJewish friends of his, thanks to which a royal armada of twentysail was organized under the command of the veteran AntonioTeles de Meneses, formerly governor of India, and now nominatedCount of Vila Pouca de Aguiar and governor of Brazil. Fivegalleons of this armada were earmarked to join Correia's squadronat Rio.14Simultaneously with the preparation of Ant6nio Teles' armadaand Salvador Correia's squadron for Angola in the Tagus, similarpreparations were being made in Holland to dispatch a powerfulfleet to reinforce Pernambuco and Itaparica. In August, 1647,the dispatch of thirty-four ships and six thousand men had beenresolved on, but the cumbersome administrative set-up of theUnited Provinces, the jealousy of the different provincial boards(Kamers) of the W.I.C., and the skilfull diplomatic intrigues andmaneuvers of the Portuguese ambassador, Francisco de SousaCoutinho, all combined to retard the equipment of the Dutcharmament until winter set in, when ice, frost, and small-poxbrought further delays, apart from contrary winds. Meanwhilethe council at Pernambuco, unaware of the decision taken to helpthem, had dispatched one of their number, Hendrik Haecxs, toHolland to solicit urgent assistance. In the Chops of the Channel,

14 J. L. d'Azevedo, Cartas do padre Ant6nio Vieira S. I. (3 vols., Coimbra, 1925-1928),I, 562; cf. Naber, ed., "Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs . . .," loc. cit., p. 159.


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500 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWHaecxs spoke a Hamburg vessel from Oporto, who gave him newsof the preparation of Ant6nio Teles' armada, adding that greatdifficulty was being experienced in finding sufficient men to manit, pressgangs being busy all over the countryside recruiting peas-ants and plowboys by force. The German skipper estimatedthat the armadawould be ready to sail by the last week in October.In this he proved a true prophet, for Ant6nio Teles left the Taguson the 18th of October, Salvador Correia de Sa and his squadronmaking the voyage to Rio de Janeiro separately.15News of the preparation of the Portuguese armada had theeffect of stepping up the tempo of the Dutch armament, whichwas placed under the command of Witte Corneliszoon de With,one of the finest of the pleiad of Dutch fighting admirals, who hadseen much service against English, Spaniards, Dunkirkers, andJavanese in four quarters of the globe. The exceptionally severewinter of 1647-48 proved the salvation of Portugal and Brazil.At a time when, as Padre Ant6nio Vieira jubilantly wrote fromthe Hague, the armada of Ant6nio Teles was already "dando bonsprincipios do ano 'aBahia," Witte de With's twelve ships were stillwind-bound in the frozen Dutch ports. Only on the 26th ofDecember could his fleet put to sea, and then it was scatteredby a fearful storm, with loss and damage to several of its com-ponents, "and particularly a very important one which was boundfor Angola, which was sunk without trace off Vlissingen," asPadre Vieira reported on 27 January, 1648. Not until Februarydid De With's storm-battered fleet finally weather Cape Finisterre,whence it made a relatively quick passage to Pernambuco, whereit arrived at the end of March.16The unfortunate experiences of "Double-With's" fleet con-trasted strongly with the prosperous voyages made by Ant6nioTeles and Salvador Correia respectively. The former's armadareached Bahia at Christmas, after an uneventful passage which

15Cf. Norton, op. cit., pp. 84-85; Naber, ed., "Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs. .. "loc. cit., pp. 208, 220. Ant6nio Teles with the Armada Real do Mar Oceano left the Tagusfor Bahia on the 18th of October, 1648; Salvador Correia with his Angola squadron leavingfor Rio de Janeiro a few weeks later in the first half of November, and not in December aserroneously stated by some modern Portuguese writers. (Cf. Naber, "T'Leven en Bedrijfvan Vice-Admirael Witte de With, Zaliger," Bijdragen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht,Deel XLVII (1926), 130; Cartas del Rei D. Joao IV para diversas autoridadesdo Reino(Lisbon, 1940), pp. 184-220.

16 Cf. Naber, ed., "Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs ... ," loc. cit., pp. 221-227; idem,"T'Leven en Bedrijf van Vice-Admirael Witte de With, Zaliger," loc. cit., pp. 124-139:Jornal da viagem da frota dos Paizes Baixos Unidos para o Brasit, principiando no dia17 dejaneiro do ano de 1648 ate o dia 17 de Maio (Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, 1931).


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES 501(to quote Padre Vieira again) "would have been a quick voyagefor even a single caravel." Von Schoppe had evacuated Itaparicaon the news of the armada's approach, and had set sail for Recifeeight or nine days before it arrived. Much to Vieira's disappoint-ment, the Dutch and Portuguese fleets did not meet each otheron the way. Salvador Correia (who left Lisbon in November)made a similarly speedy passage, of which we have an interestingaccount from the pen of the English crypto-Catholic poet andman of letters, Richard Flecknoe, savagely satirized by Drydenin later years under the guise of "Mack Flecknoe," who

In prose and verse was owned without disputeThrough all the realm of nonsense absolute....

The prickly poet-laureate was perhaps unduly harsh on poorRichard, who whatever his shortcomings as a poet, has certainlyleft us an interesting and entertaining account of his voyage "roll-ing down to Rio," marred only by a certain rather forced whim-sicality at times. After relating how the ships touched at Fun-chal, where he sampled Madeira wine in situ, extolling it as "sur-passing for generousall that ever I tasted yet," he tells how afterpassing the Canary and Cape Verde Islands, "we had the pleasant-est voyage as could be imagined, no storms, the winds hardlyhaving breath enough to fill our sails, and the air so pure, as incomparison with the pleasure of it there, that it seems a pain tobreath on land, where the air is stuffing, suffocating, and noisome,tainted as it passes with odors and filth (there being few countrieslike Arabia, affording more sweets than stenches) whereas thatof the sea comes purely (as it were) drained and purified by thesunbeams, as it passes to the sense."

He claims that the passengers could enjoy afloat the equivalentof all terrestrial pleasures. Thus hawking and hunting had theircounterpart in the sea-fowl (boobies) preying on the flying-fish,who were likewise the prey of the glittering douradosor "shinningfishes somewhat like dolphins." He describeshow the Portuguesesailors replenished the passengers' table by harpooning the doura-dos, "never failing of their cast, and thus furnished us with freshfish all the time, it being excellent meat, short and crisp like oursalmons." The Sargasso Sea, "covered all over with a certaingreen [seaweed], so thick as the ship could hardly make waythrough it, with many gridiline flowers besides like our own cro-cuses, rendering it a most delightful spectacle," affordedthe equiv-alent of a verdant garden. Sunrise and sunset were more color-


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502 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWful in these latitudes than in the northern climes; whilst "forother commodities and delicacies you have on land we wantednone. Our great cabins being large as your chambers, our bedsas commodious, our decks spacious as your galleries to walk in,our kitchen our cellars as well furnished, herds of swine, flocks ofsheep, and pullen of all sorts aboard, perpetually feasting, norwanted we music to ourfeasts, besides an excellent set of trumpets,the mariners having some fiddles amongst them to which theyoften danced to delight the passengers. And thus sleeping, eat-ing, drinking and recreating ourselves, we made our voyage securefrom storms, secure from pirates and enemies," until the squadroncast anchor in Rio de Janeiro in January, 1648. This idyllicvoyage is more reminiscent of a pleasure cruise in a modernluxury liner than of a seventeenth-century deep-sea voyage, whichis usually associated with scurvy and short-commons. Obviouslythe Carreira do Brazil was a very different affair from the Ca-rreira da India, where the sufferings and high mortality in thegrossly overcrowded carracks are vividly described in the Lusia-das of Luis de Camoes, and other contemporary relations.'7With the safe arrival of Ant6nio Teles' armada at Bahia andof Salvador Correia's squadron' at Rio, whilst Witte de With'sships lay weather-bound in Holland, the Portuguese had won thefirst round in the race against time. Ant6nio Vieira duly notedthis from his observation-post at the Hague. After receiving theadditional news of the Luso-Brazilian victory at the first battleof Guararapes (19 April, 1648), the perspicacious Jesuit wroteto his friend the Marqu6s de Niza at Paris in June, 1648, "Demaneira, Senhor, que temos Pernambuco victorioso, o Rio deJaneiro socorrido, a Bahia com armada, Angola corn a esquadrade Salvador Correia, que hoje pode ter obrado muito." A weekbefore, he had written the same correspondent, "Da esquadra deAngola se ndo tem ainda por ca noticia alguma"; whilst in hisnext letter he noted that it was uncertain whether ornot SalvadorCorreia had actually left for Angola, or what his orders were-that is, whether to retake Luanda or merely to seek for a footholdon the coast elsewhere. The same uncertainty prevails to thisday, although the official Portuguese version then and subsequent-

17 Richard Flecknoe, A Relation of Ten Yeares Travels (London, 1656), pp. 60-63.I have modernized the spelling of this rare little tract but left the punctuation more orless intact. Flecknoe's dates are vague and contradictory. It is possible that be madethe Brazil voyage in 1648-1649, and not in 1647-1648 as is generally assumed; but ineither event his inimitable account of "rolling down to Rio" in the mid-seventeenthcentury is applicable in a general way to Correia de SA'svoyage.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES 503ly was that Salvador's orders were to avoid a direct clash withthe Dutch, by founding a fort at Quicombo, whence he was to tryto open up communication overland with the hard-pressed de-fendersof Massangano and Muxima. The official version furtherexplains that Salvador was compelled to depart from the letterand spirit of his instructions, and to attack Luanda, because ofthe Dutch offensive alliance with Queen N'Zinga and the king ofthe Congo. But from the wording of several of the consultas ofthe ConselhoUltramarino and of Salvador Correia'sown represen-tations to the king between May and September, 1647, it is quiteobvious that the capture of Luanda itself was intended if foundto be practical. The establishment of a port at Quicombo orelsewhere was suggested only as an admittedly unsatisfactoryalternative, in the event of the Hollanders at Luanda being foundtoo strong to make the risk of an attack worth while.18Be this as it may, the whole expedition nearly proved abortiveat the start, for although Correia's force was strengthened by fiveroyal galleons which Ant6nio Teles, in accordance with previousorders, had detached to strengthen his squadron and which en-tered Rio roads (pace Vieira again) on the same day as himself,the news of De With's fleet reached Brazil about the same time.This naturally caused great opposition to the proposed Angolaexpedition, for it was argued with considerable cogency that itwould be wiser to keep the Portuguese armada together in orderto cope with De With's fleet, instead of sending part of it off on aproblematical wild-goose chase to Angola, leaving Rio and itsenvirons exposed to the tender mercies of "Double-With." Sal-vador himself, although he evidently considered attack to be thebest form of defense, was not uninfluenced by the prevailing criti-cism of the rashness of the projected expedition, "since manypeople opined that it was wiser to defend the stronghold of Rio,which was ours, than leave it in order to recapture that of Angola,which was then subject to the Hollander." Whilst he was thusundecided what to do, he received a letter from the Jesuit padre,Jodo d'Almeida, "Inglez de nagao, mas criado no Brazil de meni-

18 J. L. Azevedo, ed., Cartasde Ant6nio Vieira S. I., I, 142, 165, 169, 172, 179, 215, 222.Official version of Salvador's orders is in Prestage, ed., Manifesto das ostilidades of LuisFelis Cruz (1651) (Lisbon, 1920). Cf. Arquivos de Angola, 2a serie, II, No. 8 (1944),109. For the relevant consultasof the Conselho Ultramarino and the parecerof SalvadorCorreia, clearly revealing the intention to attack Luanda if possible, cf. the documentsprinted on pp. 300-301, 305. "Tudo se remediara com dezalojar o inimigo por uma vez,"as Salvador wrote on the 15th June, 1647 (Publicaguesdo Congressodo Mundo Portugu8s,IX [19403,319-324).


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504 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWno," who was locally regarded as a saint, and as such exercisedgreat influence over the devoutly Catholic Portuguese. Thefather urged him to make the voyage at all costs, and prophesieda successful outcome if he started on the feast day of SaintMichael Archangel and took the latter for patron saint of theexpedition. This sufficed to make up the general's mind. Heembarked in his flagship forthwith to show the earnestness of hisintentions, and speeded up the mustering of recruits, furnishingof supplies, and raising of money to finance the campaign, towhich last he and his family contributed lavishly from their ampleproperty and other resources at Rio. The moradoresraised a loanof sixty thousand cruzadosto finance the expedition. Such wasthe prevalent patriotic fervor, that one citizen brought his con-tribution of money-bags to the accompaniment of a band playinga lively tune. Salvador himself, writing to the king on the eveof his departure, frankly admitted that the expedition could neverhave sailed without the men and money advanced by the mora-doresof the City of SAo SebastiAo.19As enjoined by Padre Almeida, the expedition set sail on 12May, 1648, feast day of the Archangel Michael, the armada con-sisting of five royal galleons, six hired but armed merchant ships,and four smaller vessels or fifteen sail in all, manned with some1,500 men, over half of whom had been recruited and officeredinRio de Janeiro. Many of the soldiers who were not actuallyBrazilian born, were veterans of the Pernambuco campaigns aswell as those of Alemtejo, and thus the expedition can be trulydescribed as a Luso-Brazilian one in the full sense of the term.The ships came from various quarters (two of them were English)but half of the men and most of the money were supplied byBrazil. Salvador specifically stated that he had enlisted locallads on a large scale since they were "mais praticos, e sofredoresde trabalhos, e escuzar tirar da Guarnigao desta praga." TheLisbon-bound sugar-fleet of twenty-five sail was convoyed by the

19Carta que o padre Antonio do Coutto da Companhia de Jesus escreveo ao padreJeronimo Vogado provincial da mesma companhia dandolhe conta de toda a jornadaque o general Salvador Correiade S. e Benevides fez desdodia que sahio do Ryo de Janeiroathe que chegou a Angola, e de todos os sucessos athe tomar a ditta praga, Luanda, 5September 1648, MS in the Ajuda Library, Lisbon, Codex 51-VII8, folios 241v-253.Padre Simdo de Vasconcelos, S. J. (Vida do padre Joao d'Almeida [Lisbon, 1658], pp.217-240) describes the reconquest of Angola in detail. Both these Jesuit sources containinformation not to be found in the accounts of Luis Felis Crus' (Manifesto das ostilidades)and Cadornega (op. cit.), which form the basis of what most modern writers have to sayon the matter. For the Dutch version, cf. Naber's introduction to the "Nota" of PieterMoorthamer.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES 505squadron as far as Latitude 20'S Longitude 14021, W; where itwas detached to follow its voyage to Portugal. The crossingproved a difficult one, mountainous seas "running as high as theclouds," according to the hyperbolic description of the Jesuitpadre, Ant6nio do Couto, who has left us an account of the voyagein which he took part. Two of the smallest vessels could notcope with the high seas and put back to Rio, when only three orfour days out. Two other pinnaces and the almiranta (vice-ad-miral's ship) likewise parted company at various times. Thealmirantarejoined the squadron on the 9th July whilst one of thepinnaces came up with the fleet off Luanda, the other arrivingwhen everything was over. It was thus with only eleven sail thatSalvador Correia sighted the African coast on the 12th July inLatitude 18? S.20The crossing had taken exactly two months, long enough per-haps, but two weeks less than Houtbeen's difficult voyage sevenyears before, when the whole Dutch fleet narrowly escaped mis-carryingfor want of water. The Portuguese were evidently bettersupplied, for we meet with no complaints of material shortages onthe voyage. On the contrary, Padre Couto tells us that the timewas taken up by military preparations of all kinds, the shipsbeing cleared and ready for action, whilst the foreign gunners andengineers, "of whom there were several," busied themselves withpreparing hand grenades and so forth. No enemy was encoun-tered, but the squadron overshot Benguela (which the general hadintended to attack) in the dark one night, and it anchored offQuicombo roadstead on the 27th of July. During this time theredoubtable Dutch Admiral de Witte was cruising off Bahia afterhaving careened his ships off "The Red Land" of Paraiba earlyin May. From the crew of a prize taken on the 5th June, helearned that the Rio sugar-fleet had sailed direct for Lisbon, afterleaving Salvador Correia to continue his voyage "with 6 or 7galleons, some smaller ships and about 2,000 of the militia fromRio de Janeiro, bound for Angola with the resolve to beat up ourpeople there." Witte at once sent post-haste to Recife to notifythe council of this alarming intelligence, but he states they tookno notice of this warning, although it was twice repeated later.The chance of sending his fleet in pursuit of Salvador's squadronwas thus lost.

20 Carta que o padre Antonio do Coutto ... escreveo .. ., loc. cit.; and Vasconcelos,op. cit., passim; Publicagaes do Congresso do Mundo Portugues, IX (1940); Norton, op.cit., 240-241, 250-255.


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506 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWAccording to the official version, Quicombo was Salvador'sdestination, since he was supposed to found a fortress here andget in touch with the defenders of Massangano overland. PadreCouto, however, who accompanied the expedition and wrote hisaccount of it on the 5th September, 1648, explicitly stated thatthe squadron only stopped here for wood and water on its wayto Luanda. This alone goes far to confirm the supposition thatSalvador had secret orders enjoining him to attack the capital ofthe colony if practicable. In any event, disaster overtook thefleet here. As the squadron lay at anchor in the roads on theevening of the 1st August, a violent submarine quake occurred,which though intense was evidently extremely local, since thewater in the offing "remained a sea of roses." The flagship camewithin an ace of being lost, whilst the almiranta foundered andbroke her back soon after midnight-with the loss of over twohundred of the best troops in the expedition. The few survivors(most of whom saved themselves by swimming) included a soldierwho was found next day in the stranded forepart of the hull.Like the classic Roman sentinel of Pompeii, he had remainedfaithfully (and eventually safely) at his post on guard over theregimental flags where he had been placed. Another disasterovertook a reconnaissance party sent ashore to try to capture someprisoners and gain intelligence. This party was likewise involvedin the earthquake, and the survivors were killed and eaten by thelocal cannibals.The loss of the almiranta and so many men might well havedaunted most people, but Salvador Correia was made of sternerstuff. Luanda was now openly proclaimed as the objective andthither the fleet set sail, after first recovering the ill-fated re-

connaissance party's sloop. A stop was made at the mouth ofthe Suto River where another party was set on shore with lettersfor the defenders of Massangano, telling them to advance fromup-country and assist the squadron to attack Luanda. This partywas nearly as unlucky as the other. They were captured byhostile natives who turned them over to a Dutch post on theKwanza. The Hollanders thus learnt of Correia's arrival andintentions. Although it was too late for them to warn their com-patriots in the capital, they prevented -thePortuguese at Massan-gano from knowing what was toward.2'Salvador's squadron appeared off Luanda on the 12th August.There were two Dutch ships in the harbor, which at once put out

2Ibid.; Naber, "T'Leven en Bedrijf van Vice-Admirael Witte de With, Zaliger,"loc. cit., p. 133.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES 507to sea to reconnoiterthe newcomers. On discovering their nation-ality, they forthwith disappeared over the horizon, leaving thegarrison of Luanda the less by fifty soldiers whom they had onboard. This was not the only piece of luck Salvador had, forlike Houtbeen seven years before him, he was still ignorant of thetrue state of affairs ashore. Just as the Dutch Admiral's doubtshad been resolved by the opportune capture of the helpful Span-ish skipper of the Jesus Maria Jose, so the Portuguese com-mander's perplexities were now solved by the capture of twoNegro fishermen. These told Salvador that 220 picked Dutchtroops were away up-country on an expedition with Queen N'Zin-ga against the Portuguese, and that the remainder of the garrison(about six hundred men apparently) had retired to the hill fort(Morro) on the appearance of the Portuguese squadron, takingwith them from the city what stores and chattels they couldsecure.Encouraged by this news, Salvador entered the roadstead withhis ships and sent a Dutch-speaking emissary ashore to demandthe peaceful surrender of the place. The defenders asked to beallowed three days to make up their minds, which the generalreadily conceded them. This is rather astonishing, for, as mighthave been expected, they used these days to strengthen theirdefenses and fetch in a supply of water, returning a defiant answerat the end of this period. The Portuguese landed at daybreakon the feast day of Our Lady of the Assumption (15 August)apparently in the same place where Jol had landed seven yearsbefore. Numerous dummies of soldiers and flags were left inthe galleons and rowed ashore in the ship's boats, to give thedefenders the impression that the attackers were far more numer-ous than they really were. Judging by later results, this strata-gem was evidently successful.As soon as the landing party of a thousand men (eight hundredsoldiers and two hundred sailors) had formed up on the cliff abovethe shore, the march on the city began, Salvador riding part ofthe way on horseback since he had a bad leg. He was thus aconspicuous target for the Dutch cannon which fired repeatedlyon the advancing column but miraculously without effect, thoughmany shots fell close. A halt was made for the celebration of afield-mass half-way, after which the attack on the city was begunby the vanguard. The Hollanders only intended to fight a de-laying action, so they put up merely a token resistance in thetown and speedily withdrew to the shelter of the Morro fort whensthe Portuguese pressed their advance.


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508 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWNext day the Portuguese commander opened approachesagainst the Morro, and began an artillery bombardment, but theresults were virtually nil, since only field-pieces of small caliberwere available. He was anxiously awaiting the arrival of theforces from Massangano, unaware that his messengers had allmiscarried and that the Dutch in the interior had inflicted (withthe aid of Queen N'Zinga) a crushing defeat on his compatriots,who were therefore in no condition to come to his help and couldhardly defend themselves for more than a few days longer.The infantry captains of the Rio expeditionary force, en-couraged by the feeble Dutch resistance in the town, and im-patient at the failure of the artillery bombardment, warmlypressed their commander to order a general assault, and ratherreluctantly he consented. The attack was fixed for just beforedawn on the night of the 17-18th, with three columns convergingon the Morro from three directions. Unfortunately, as is usualwith night-attacks, the timing miscarried in the darkness andresultant confusion. The central column having the easiest andmost direct way to go, reached its objective first, and being de-scried by an outpost, delivered its attack without waiting for

the other two. These consequently found the garrison fully pre-pared to receive them when they delivered their belated assaultssuccessively. Nevertheless the Portuguese columns continuedtheir efforts till daylight with admirable pertinacity, when Sal-vador seeing that their attacks were fruitless sounded the generalrecall. The attackers then withdrew with a loss of nearly twohundred killed and wounded out of total force of little over fourhundred. The Dutch casualties were negligible, since they hadthe security of their walls and the darkness of the night to aidthem.22The position of Salvador and his men was now anything butenviable. Even though they did not know it, effective help fromMassangano was out of the question, after the annihilation of

22Cadornega has a good description of the assault, as does Padre Simao de Vasconcelosin his Vida do padre Jodo d'Almeida, which is dedicated to Salvador Correia de Sd asreconqueror of Angola and patron of the Jesuit missions in Brazil. Estimates of thecasualties vary considerably. Couto, who wrote his Carta about three weeks later, writes"neste conflito nos ferirao alguns 80 homens, e morrerAomais de 20, huns logo, outrosdepois no Hospital," but other estimates are higher. King John IV, reporting the recon-quest to the Marqu6s de Niza at Paris in a letter dated 29 November, 1648, gives the casu-alties in the assault as 140 killed and wounded. The authorities likewise differon the date ofthe actual attack, some placing it on the 17-18th and others on the 18-19th. On this lastpoint I have followed Luis Crus in preference to Padre Couto who implies it was the 19thCrus positively states that it was in the early hours of the 18th, before dawn.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES 509Manuel de N6brega's flying column by the Dutch and QueenN'Zinga on the 1st August. On the contrary, the victors, flushedwith their success, were rapidly approaching Luanda by forcedmarches, since they had been recalled to the city by DirectorOuman when the Portuguese fleet had been sighted on the 12th.Apart from this, over four hundred men had been lost or renderedhors-de-combat n the sunken galleon Sdo Luis and in the un-successful assault on the Morro, whilst others were daily sickeningin the unhealthy climate. Such a casualty rate had naturallymade great inroads on a force which barely totalled 1,500 when itleft Rio, nor would it be easy for the survivors to defend the ram-bling extent of the city against Queen N'Zinga's hordes and theDutch from one side, and against the garrison of the Morro fromthe other.The astonishment of the Portuguese may be imagined, when afew hours after the abortive attack on the Morro, the defendershoisted the white flag and sent pourparlersannouncing their will-ingness to surrender, not merely the fort, but all their outlyingsettlements at Kwanza, Benguela, etc., as well, if granted favor-able terms! It need hardly be added that Salvador did not needasking twice, but told the Flemings that they could draw up theirown terms. This they did, and they were duly signed by bothparties on the 21st August. It was stipulated that the Dutchwere to evacuate the entire colony, taking their property withthem, whilst the Portuguese were to provide adequate shippingfor the voyage. The garrison was to march out with the honorsof war, drums beating and colors flying, five days being allowedto complete their evacuation, and to await the arrival of MajorPieterszoon's column from up-country. A certain number ofFrench and other Catholic soldiers in Dutch service were allowedto stay and sign on with the Portuguese. The terms were punc-tiliously fulfilled, and thus the Hollanders marched out of thefortress on the 26th August, 1648, seven years to the day afterAdmiral Jol (alias P6 de Pau) had entered it. The wheel hadcome full circle.23

23 This point was duly noted by Padre Couto. The terms of the surrenderwere signedon the 21st of August, as can be seen from the copy printed in the Manifesto das ostilidadesand reprinted in the Arquivosde Angola, loc. cit., 145-147. Oddly enough, they had beenprinted in Holland as early as 1649, in a (nowadays exceedingly rare) broadside issued atAmsterdam, together with King John IV's covering letter to the Marques de Niza,mentioned in the previous note and reprinted in the Arquivos deAngola. Although signedon the 21st, the terms allowed the Dutch five days to evacuate the fort, and hence theirrear-party did not leave until the 26th, the anniversary of Jol's entry. The Morro fort


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510 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWIt is needless to describe the joy of the "forlorn hope" atMuxima and Massangano, since the Portuguese in the interiorsaw themselves delivered at the eleventh hour from certain de-struction. Nor need we describe the rejoicings which took place inLuanda itself; the formal consecration of the desecrated churchesand convents; the renaming of the city in honor of Our Lady ofthe Assumption "on whose Day, Feast and Octave, the enterprisewas begun, won, and ended"; and t4ie measures taken by Sal-vador Correia de Sa e Benevides as governor and captain-generalto consolidate his hold on the colony. Sdo Tome was likewiseevacuated by its Dutch garrison on the news of the capitulationof Luanda, whilst Benguela and the other places were taken overwithout any trouble. The Portuguese position in West Africawas thus back to where it had been in 1641, and a supply of thevital slave-labor for Brazil was assured.The international reactions, though important, can only bebriefly touched on here. The Dutch naturally accused King JohnIV of a breach of faith, but in view of the way they had acquiredthe colony seven years earlier, their complaints carried convictionto nobody, probably not even to themselves, The economic reper-

cussions were more important. In July, 1648, when the where-abouts and intentions of Salvador Correia's squadron were stillunknown in Europe, Padre Ant6nio Vieira reported from theHague that Luso-Dutch diplomatic discussions had reached adeadlock over the question of Angola-"f or the company insistson remaining absolute masters of the whole coast and states thatthe trade with our fortresses in the interior must all pass throughtheir ports, and that we must pay them the dues which we former-ly paid there to the king." Apropos of the same matter, he wroteagain on 12 August (what time Salvador was anchoring in Luandaroads), "All the argument is now over Angola, and this is a pointon which they cannot yield, for without Negroes there is noPernambuco, and without Angola there are no Negroes."24Subsequent events were to justify the Jesuit's aphorism tothe full, for one of the reasons why the Dutch reacted relativelywas renamed after the Archangel Michael, whom Salvador had selected as patron saint ofthe enterprise, and on whose feast day (12 May) he had left Rio de Janeiro at the sugges-tion of the Anglo-Brazilian Jesuit, Padre JoAo d'Almeida. Naber has pointed out thatPortuguese versions of the surrender terms transcribe the word Aerdemburgh as a propername, whereas it was merely the Dutch equivalent of Morro. The Dutch forces in Angolaat the time of their surrender totalled a little over one thousand men, distributed ap-proximately as follows: Luanda, 600; Major S. Pieterszoon's flying column, 220; Benguelaand Kwanza River posts, 200 men.

24 J. L. Azevedo, ed., Cartas de Antonio Vieira S. I., I, 243.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES 511calmly to the final loss of Pernambuco in 1654, was that therewas no economic future for their colony without an assured supplyof Negroes from Angola, and that had gone with the wind thatwafted their departing garrison from the African shore in Sep-tember, 1648. The same point occurs in one of the typical pas-quils of the period which reflect the state of Dutch public opinionon various matters. In this particular pamphlet (AmsterdamsDam-Praetje, 1649) one of the dramatic personae inquires whetherit is not possible to arrange some compromise with Portugal onthe lines of a joint condominion in Angola. To this the Portu-guese spokesman retorts that the complete and undisputed pos-session of the Angola slave-market is just as essential to Portugalas is the North Sea herring fishery to the Dutch. However muchof an exaggeration this claim may have been when applied toPortugal per se, it was certainly nothing less than the truth asregards the supply of labor for colonial Brazil.25From the foregoing it is perhaps sufficiently clear that thestruggle for Angola three hundred years ago was primarily astruggle for the most lucrative slave-market in West Africa.Whosoever possessed the slave depots and harbors on the WestAfrican coast held the key to the economic development of muchof the New World. The mining industries in parts of SpanishAmerica, the sugar plantations of Portuguese Brazil, as later theEuropean colonies in the Caribbean and the tobacco fields ofVirginia, all depended for their progress on an adequate supplyof African slave labor. Just as nowadays the great powers fightfor oil, so three centuries ago they fought for black ivory.Regarded in this light, Salvador Correia'sreconquest of Angolain 1648 saved the Portuguese colonial empire from ruin. Morethan that, it saved the existence of the mother-country itself.For Portugal stood no earthly chance in her twenty-eight-yearswar of independence against Spain (1640-1668), at a time whenshe was likewise fighting the strongest naval power in the world(Holland), without the resources she derived from her possessionof Brazil. Well might King John IV term Brazil his vaca de leite,

25AmsterdamsDam-Praetje, vanwat outs en wat nieuws en wat vreemts Amsterdam, 1649).Angola figures prominently in this pasquil, which is undoubtedly one of those subsidizedby the Portuguese ambassador, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho. It is worth noting thatthree out of the five interlocutors who figure as the dramatis personae (Edward Man,Isaac van Beeck, and a Mr. Raij) were real personages and actual directors (bewindhebbers)of the W. I. C. The two latter are mentioned in this capacity on pp. 158 and 241 of theDagboekvan Hendrik Haecxs (1645-1654), as well as in various pamphlets (Breeden-Raedt,etc.) of the time. Edward Man was an elder of the English Church in Holland, and astaunch Commonwealth supporter.


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512 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEWfor she was indeed Portugal's milch-cow then and for long after-wards. It was the money obtained from the sale of Braziliansugar and tobacco which paid for the upkeep of the armies whoheld the Spaniard at bay along the frontier. It was Brazil whichfurnished the bulk of the fantastic dowery of Catherine of Bra-ganza for her marriage to Charles II, thus securing the vitaldiplomatic support of the merry but impecunious monarch againstHolland and Spain. It was the sale of the Brazilian productswhich atoned for the shortcomings of Portugal's own ill-balancedeconomy, and gave her the wherewithal to pay for the imports ofcorn and grain from the Baltic countries without which she wouldhave starved. In fact, the national survival of Portugal in theseventeenth century, and hence her importance as a great colonialpower in the world today, derives directly from her economicexploitation of Brazil. That in turn depended on the reconquestof Angola-a mae preta.

APPENDIX IDUTCH FLEET FOR THE CAPTURE OF LUANDA, 30 MAY-26 AUGUST, 1641

(ADMIRAL CORNELIS JOL, NICKNAMED HOUTBEEN OR PE DE PAU)*Ship Sailors SoldiersAmsterdam (flagship) ....... 89 216 Cornelis JolMooriaen (Vice-Admiral)..... 42 122 Jacob HuygenszoonEendracht (Rear-Admiral).... 48 84 Matheus JansenSwol..................... 67 134

Enchuysen ................ 62 133Overijsel .................. 58 112Leyden ................... 55 101Soutelande................ 48 128Leeuwinne ................ 46 104Charitas .................. 45 66St. Jacob .................. 41 155Orpheus................... 40 218GroeneWijif ............... 40 82ConinckDavid ............. 32 91GrooteGerrit............... 30 40

*Based on the list given by K. Ratelband on p. 3 of his article in De West-IndischeGids, XXIV (The Hague, 1943). The troops were commanded by Lieutenant-ColonelHenderson, an English mercenary soldier in the service of the W.I.C., and were formedinto fourteen companies. Pieter Moorthamer (or Mortamer) sailed on board this fleetwith the nomination of director of the captured colony, which post he held until September,1642.


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SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES 513Liefde .................... 22 120 (Brazilian Indians)Steenhuys ................. 14 120 (Brazilian Indians)Schelvis (Yacht) ............ 22 30Koin (Yacht)............... 20 20Hasenwint (Yacht) .......... 15 15Hennitgen (Yacht) .......... 15 15

TOTAL .851.. X81 2 106APPENDIX II

PORTUGUESE FLEET FOR THE RECAPTURE OF LUANDA, 12 MAY-26 AUGUST,1648 (SALVADOR CORREIA DA SX E BENEVIDES, GENERALDA ARMADA DE SUA MAGESTADE.)

Nossa Senhora da Concei~do (capitanaor flagship) Clemente MartinsSdo Luis (almiranta) M. Pacheco de MeloSanto Tomds Luis Barbosa de FrangaSanta Margarida e Santa Marta Manoel PinheiroSanto Antonio (urca) Alvaro de NovaesCaridade Jodo SoromenhoNossa Senhora dos Remediose Almas Francisco FernandesSanto Antonio (charrua) uncertainPedra or Sao Pedro (English) George Dobens (?)Alexander (English) Joseph- (?)Santo Milagre Manoel Almeida FalcaoSao Gabriel Francisco Gomes da VinhaTres Reis Magos Gaspar RubimNossa Senhora da Concei~doe SantoAntonio Manoel Lopes AnginoNossa Senhora do Rosario e Sao Jodode Deus Antonio Vaz de Oliveira

The first five vessels were royal galleons and ships detached byAnt6nio Teles from the Armada Real at Bahia in January, 1648; thenext six were freighted at Lisbon with the aid of Jewish capitalists,whilst the last four were freighted by Salvador Correia at Rio. Thetwo last named seem to have been identical with the pinnaces nicknamedGamela (trough) and Canoa (canoe) in Padre Couto's account. Esti-mates of the force on board this armada vary from 1,200 to 1,500, apartfrom volunteers. The grand total was probably nearer the latter figure,of whom about 1,100 reached Luanda.

_Boxer1948 Salvador de Sá

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